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CONSENT TO INTIMATE REGULATION* 
KAIPONANEA T. MATSUMURA** 
Approximately fifteen percent of the adult population in the 
United States—more than 35 million people—are in informal 
intimate relationships. In contrast to the highly regulated marital 
relationship, unmarried partners largely evade laws that turn on 
relationship status. This invisibility has benefits and costs: 
partners can walk away from the relationship without 
burdensome judicial involvement, but they also miss out on laws 
that create joint property ownership or provide survivor benefits 
upon death. Most courts and scholars agree that the law should 
extend some rights and obligations to people in nonmarital 
relationships, but they have struggled to solve the puzzle of when 
and to whom the rights and obligations should flow. The existing 
implied contract and implied status approaches have not been 
wholly unsuccessful at providing rights to nonmarital partners, 
but they work infrequently and incoherently. That is because they 
have either dismissed consent or have misinterpreted it, favoring 
nonviable rationales such as dependency creation or similarity to 
marriage.  
This Article seeks to reclaim consent as the basis to regulate 
informal intimate relationships. As a conclusion about the nexus 
between will, conduct, and consequence, consent is an analytic 
tool well suited to interrogating when intimate relationships 
should trigger legal consequences. This Article proposes two 
doctrinal improvements to establish whether nonmarital partners 
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have consented to regulation. First, it outlines an objective 
approach to determine whether parties’ conduct justifies the 
imposition of relevant legal obligations. Second, it argues that the 
inquiry should often focus on discrete commitments—whether 
property sharing, ongoing financial support, or 
companionship—rather than all of the bundled rights and 
obligations of marriage. Nonmarital partners may often consent 
to some, but not all, of these obligations. This improved consent 
framework suggests reforms to existing doctrines and also 
grounds functional approaches that respond to nonmarital 
partners’ needs and lived experiences. 
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Consider when, if ever, the following relationships should trigger 
legal obligations, either between the partners themselves, or between 
the partners and the state: 
Anna and Ben: Anna and Ben move into a rented apartment 
after they graduate from college. They dated during their senior year 
and are known to be a couple. They split the rent and expenses, like 
groceries, but they maintain separate bank accounts. They separately 
purchase big-ticket items, like furniture and electronics, but try to 
even out the expenses. After a few years, Anna decides to go to law 
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school. Although she takes out student loans in her name, Ben covers 
her share of the rent. They never explicitly exchange promises, but 
Anna subjectively believes that she will do the same if she is ever able 
to help Ben. After law school, Anna makes a much higher salary, but 
Ben has been doing quite well at work himself. Both make over 
$100,000, and they file income taxes as singles, thereby paying several 
thousand dollars less than they would if married. By now, Anna and 
Ben have lived together for nearly a decade. 
Camille and David: Camille and David start dating on-and-off in 
high school. Camille gets a job at a big-box retail store and, after two 
years, becomes a manager. Camille eventually becomes pregnant with 
David’s child, even though he is seeing several different women at the 
time. Camille is excited to be pregnant; she wants someone to take 
care of. After he hears the news, David decides to move in with 
Camille to help raise the child and to provide a more traditional 
family environment. Camille continues to pay the rent on her one-
bedroom apartment. Her salary, while consistent, is only enough to 
cover the living expenses from month to month. David helps out 
when he can but does not have a steady job. He likes to purchase gifts 
for the child, like toys or a new pair of shoes, but doesn’t contribute 
much to the child’s daily expenses. Camille doesn’t mind having 
David around, and she loves him, but she knows that he has cheated 
on her in the past, and she is also wary of his ability to hold down a 
job. 
Eunice and Fanny: Eunice and Fanny met when Fanny moved 
into the same retirement community a few years ago. Eunice was 
recently widowed. She has two adult children who live out of state. 
She owns her house, which she purchased with proceeds from the sale 
of her marital residence. She has several hundred thousand dollars in 
assets. Fanny also has two adult children. She divorced her husband 
about a decade ago. She also owns her house and has several hundred 
thousand dollars in savings. Eunice and Fanny began spending time 
together because they had so much in common. Eventually, they 
realized that they were sexually, as well as emotionally, attracted to 
each other. They spend several nights a week together, alternating 
between their houses. They also spend virtually every day together, 
watching television, going for walks, or taking vacations. They 
consider this relationship to be the most intimate they have 
experienced, but they do not want to marry because of concerns 
about the impact of marriage on their Social Security benefits and on 
their estates. 
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*     *     * 
These examples illustrate a growing social trend. Despite its 
continuing centrality to the legal regulation of the family, marriage 
has nearly lost its position as the predominant family form in the 
United States. In 1967, 70.3% of the adult population lived in married 
households.1 Fifty years later, that share has dropped to 51.5%.2 One 
in five adults over the age of twenty-five, 42 million of them, have 
never married, and one in four adults currently aged twenty-five to 
thirty-four may never do so.3 Unmarried cohabitants—over 18 million 
of them—now make up 7.1% of the adult population.4 An even 
greater share of the adult population report’s being in committed 
intimate relationships while living in separate residences, giving rise 
to the label “Living Apart Together” (“LATs”).5 
The law currently has little to say about these tens of millions of 
nonmarital relationships. All three of the relationships just described 
might dissolve without ever attracting the state’s attention. This 
brings some benefits: Anna qualifies for federal loans for which she 
might have been ineligible if Ben’s income was factored in,6 and they 
both save several thousand dollars a year in income tax payments.7 
Camille avoids liability for David’s financial obligations. Additionally, 
David’s income will not factor into her eligibility for federal benefits 
 
 1. See Table AD-3: Living Arrangements of Adults 18 and Over, 1967 to Present, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2017), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo
/families/adults.html [https://perma.cc/Y6BN-QV2A] (follow “Table AD-3. Living 
Arrangements of Adults 18 and Over, 1967 to Present” hyperlink). Other options besides 
living with a spouse include living alone, living with one’s parents, living with an intimate 
partner, living with other relatives, or living with nonrelatives (i.e., roommates). See id. 
 2. See id. 
 3. WENDY WANG & KIM PARKER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., RECORD SHARE OF 
AMERICANS HAVE NEVER MARRIED 4, 12 (2014), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2014/09/2014-09-24_Never-Married-Americans.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2G5H-CL87]. 
 4. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 1.  
 5. See Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matter in Family Law?, 13 J. L. & 
FAM. STUD. 289, 310–11 (2011); see also Jacquelyn J. Benson & Marilyn Coleman, Older 
Adults Developing a Preference for Living Apart Together, 78 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 797, 
797 (2016). 
 6. See Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1294–96 (2014); 
see also Basic Eligibility Criteria, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa
/eligibility/basic-criteria [https://perma.cc/38LS-V43W] (noting that “financial need” is a 
general eligibility requirement for federal student aid). 
 7. See Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for 
Individual Tax Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 616–17 (explaining that 
couples who earn similar or equal incomes experience little to no benefit from filing joint 
taxes). 
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like the Earned Income Tax Credit.8 Eunice avoids losing Social 
Security widow benefits,9 and she and Fanny both avoid having to 
redo their estate plans to make sure that their property passes to their 
children. And they all avoid the potential expense of a judicially 
supervised divorce. But the couples also miss out on valuable rights 
currently given to married couples, including rights as against the 
state, third parties, and the spouses themselves. In all three situations, 
the less-well-off partner would struggle to establish his or her 
entitlement to shared property or support. If Ben is killed in an 
accident, Anna cannot sue for wrongful death and will not inherit 
Ben’s estate without a will. David likely cannot get health insurance 
from Camille’s employer. And Eunice or Fanny may be denied 
visitation or medical decision-making authority if one of them ends 
up hospitalized. Moreover, to the extent that the state would like to 
use intimate relationships as a regulatory tool—to enforce morality, 
privatize dependency, and administer laws, among other 
objectives10—the lack of regulation amounts to a missed opportunity. 
Most states offer pathways for nonmarital couples to formalize 
their relationships. A handful of states and municipalities have 
created statuses like civil unions and domestic partnerships that 
provide a defined set of legal rights and obligations for couples who 
formally register.11 Additionally, in the forty years following the 
Supreme Court of California’s pathbreaking Marvin v. Marvin12 
decision, nearly all states allow nonmarital partners to enter binding 
agreements regarding their respective property rights.13 The use of 
 
 8. See, e.g., Do I Qualify for EITC?, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions
/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit/do-i-qualify-for-earned-income-tax-credit-eitc 
[https://perma.cc/7NQR-ZFM9]. 
 9. See Michael J. Brien, Stacy Dickert-Conlin & David A. Weaver, Widows Waiting 
to Wed? (Re)Marriage and Economic Incentives in Social Security Widow Benefits 2 (Soc. 
Sec. Admin. Office of Research, Evaluation, & Statistics, Paper No. 89, 2001), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/workingpapers/wp89.html [https://perma.cc/C98C-77QA]. 
 10. See, e.g., Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Choosing Marriage, 50 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 
1999, 2035–41 (2017). 
 11. See, e.g., John G. Culhane, After Marriage Equality, What’s Next for Relationship 
Recognition?, 60 S.D. L. REV. 375, 382–85 (2015) (describing statuses, like Colorado 
designated beneficiaries and Hawaii reciprocal beneficiaries, that can extend to two adults 
who may be in a presumptively non-sexual relationship, like a parent and child); Douglas 
NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its 
Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 114–54 (2014) (describing the historical 
adoption of municipal and statewide domestic partner registries in California). 
 12. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
 13. See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 47–48 (2010) (noting that all but three states recognize some form of agreements 
between cohabitants). 
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formalities, like registering for a formal status or executing a written 
agreement, identifies the partners’ preferences and minimizes the risk 
of erroneous determinations. Partners seeking to enter a domestic 
partnership in California, for example, must fill out, sign, notarize, 
and file a Declaration of Domestic Partnership, in which they declare 
that they meet statutory-eligibility requirements.14 A written 
agreement memorializes the parties’ intentions and is often 
accompanied by procedural safeguards,15 such as reliance on legal 
counsel. Formalities provide evidence of the partners’ intentions, 
caution them against inconsiderate action, and focus their attention 
on the conduct likely to affect their legal rights.16 
The problem is that most nonmarital partners do not engage 
these formalities. Couples wishing to formalize their relationships 
marry; they rarely elect to enter a formal nonmarital status. For 
instance, during the first three months that civil unions were available 
in Illinois, only 87 of 1,470 couples entering civil unions in Cook 
County were marriage-eligible.17 In 2015, after same-sex marriage 
became legal in Hawaii, only 23 couples entered civil unions 
compared to the 22,820 who married.18 Since Colorado created a 
designated beneficiary status in 2009 allowing two unmarried people 
to agree to provide one another with legal rights, benefits, and 
protections, only 672 couples in three populous counties registered as 
designated beneficiaries in comparison to the approximately 131,100 
who married.19 Written agreements between nonmarital partners also 
appear to be rare.20 
 
 14. See CAL. FAM. CODE §	297 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2018 Reg. Sess. 
laws); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, DOMESTIC PARTNERS REGISTRY FORMS & FEES, 
DECLARATION OF DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP 1, http://dp.cdn.sos.ca.gov/forms/sf-dp1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3V7E-U8SF] (setting forth eligibility requirements for domestic 
partnership). 
 15. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941) 
(noting that written agreements serve an evidentiary and cautionary function). 
 16. See id. at 800–03 (describing evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions 
performed by formalities and explaining how they interrelate). As many scholars have 
observed, formalities do not eliminate the risk of error, see, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Identity 
and Form, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 747, 807–28 (2015) (discussing a formal identity model and 
highlighting the inherent problems when the law depends on formalities); Matsumura, 
supra note 10, at 2048–49, but they reduce the risk considerably. 
 17. See COOK COUNTY CLERK DAVID ORR, OPPOSITE-SEX CIVIL UNIONS: 
MOTIVES FOR NOT MARRYING 1, https://www.cookcountyclerk.com/sites/default/files/pdfs
/Opposite%20Sex%20Civil%20Union%20Report%20Final%2012.19.11.pdf [https://perma.cc
/NB5H-WFDT].  
 18. Preliminary 2015 Vital Statistics, ST. HAW., DEP’T HEALTH, 
http://health.hawaii.gov/vitalstatistics/preliminary-2015/ [https://perma.cc/Y8G4-RNDT]. 
 19. Based on searches of the online public records systems of Colorado’s largest 
counties. Denver County issued only 465 Designated Beneficiary Agreements from 2009 
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Most nonmarital relationships develop organically with questions 
about legal ramifications arising after the partners have intertwined 
their lives in various respects. Without formalities, the regulatory 
challenges are daunting. Imperfectly calibrated entrance 
requirements to relationship-based statuses will sweep too broadly, 
dragging in people who had no intention of assuming legal 
obligations, or too narrowly, thereby excluding people who stood to 
benefit from those protections. Any serious effort to recognize 
nonmarital relationships must therefore answer when, short of formal 
registration, a relationship will trigger various legal rights and 
obligations.21 
 
to 2017, compared to 47,799 marriage licenses during the same period. Denver Clerk and 
Recorder Online Services, OFFICE OF THE CLERK & RECORDER, 
https://countyfusion3.kofiletech.us/countyweb/disclaimer.jsp. El Paso County issued only 
62 Designated Beneficiary Agreements from 2009 to 2017, compared to 49,296 marriage 
and civil union licenses. Marriage/Civil Union Records Search, CLERK & RECORDER, 
http://recordingsearch.car.elpasoco.com/rsui/MarriageRecords/Search.aspx. Jefferson 
County issued 145 Designated Beneficiary Agreements from 2009 to 2017, compared to 
34,082 marriage licenses. Clerk and Recorder Web Access, JEFFERSON CTY., COLO., 
https://landrecords.co.jefferson.co.us/Marriage/SearchEntry.aspx. Aggregation of the 
numbers performed by author using online search databases for Denver County, Jefferson 
County, and El Paso County. 
 20. I am unaware of a systematic study of the prevalence of written agreements 
between nonmarital partners. Anecdotally, legal disputes reported in case law rarely, if 
ever, involve the validity of such agreements. See generally Albertina Antognini, The Law 
of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2017) (describing the relevant case law). 
 21. Several scholars have proposed models for regulating intimate relationships that 
touch on this question, at least in passing. These proposals have (1) focused on the 
conscription of couples in marriage-like relationships, see generally, BOWMAN, supra note 
13 (imposing marital property obligations on long-term cohabitants); Lawrence W. 
Waggoner, Marriage Is on the Decline and Cohabitation Is on the Rise: At What Point, if 
Ever, Should Unmarried Partners Acquire Marital Rights?, 50 FAM. L.Q. 215, 235–36 
(2016) (proposing to treat long-term cohabitants as married for all purposes); see also 
William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal 
for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677, 1716–18 (1984) (suggesting that 
legislation recognizing a new status for cohabitants could clarify their rights and 
obligations); (2) advocated for the expansion of status-alternatives to marriage, see 
Culhane, supra note 11, at 376 (examining “the establishment and subsequent flowering of 
several new forms of legally recognized relationships”); (3) argued for the expansion of 
rights to people outside the traditional sexual dyad, see generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF, 
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 
(2008) (proposing to offer legal benefits to relationships that perform the functions those 
benefits seek to reward); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
189 (2007) (exploring how family law could recognize and protect purely platonic 
relationships); (4) considered rules that would strengthen contractual rights, see generally 
Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573 (2013) (proposing “registered 
contractual relationships” as a legal-status alternative to marriage in which couples sign a 
contract defining their rights and obligations to each other); Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, 
Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 159 (2013) (criticizing 
courts’ use of the public policy doctrine to avoid enforcement of intimate agreements); see 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2018) 
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There is a developing consensus that the law should recognize 
informal relationships, at least for some purposes. Jurisdictions have 
taken two approaches. First is an implied contract approach—many 
of the states that follow Marvin allow partners to attempt to establish 
the existence of unwritten agreements, although these attempts are 
often “uncertain and costly.”22 Second is an informal status 
approach—a small number of courts have recognized that certain 
relationships will give rise to enforceable duties based on the nature 
of the relationship rather than the exchange of express or implied 
promises.23 This is also the approach advocated in the American Law 
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (“ALI 
Principles”), under which the sharing of a common residence for a 
predetermined period of time would give rise to a presumption that 
the couple are domestic partners.24 
The existing approaches rarely produce satisfactory outcomes. 
Courts seldom recognize implied contracts because they hold litigants 
to stringent standards, expecting either that every contingency be 
expressly bargained for or that the parties have made “marriage-like 
commitments.”25 In doing so, the implied contract approach departs 
 
also June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 108–10, 112 (2016) 
(asserting that the law “should respect independent actors who manage their own 
relationship terms”); or (5) advocated more generally for the recognition of a space 
outside of marriage, see, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to 
Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L. REV. 425, 481–87 (2017) (outlining a constitutional right to 
nonmarriage); Melissa Murray, Accommodating Nonmarriage, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 
664–66 (2015) (calling for greater accommodation of nonmarital relationships as a 
meaningful alternative to marriage). 
 22. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for 
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 255–56. 
 23. See infra notes 156–58 and accompanying text. 
 24. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §	6.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002). 
 25. Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of 
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 885 (2005) [hereinafter, Garrison, Is 
Consent Necessary?]; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The Legal 
Treatment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435, 1447 (2001) 
(“[I]n order to bring a claim successfully, a partner must establish that the cohabitation 
was the substantive equivalent of marriage.”); Scott, supra note 22, at 258 (emphasizing 
the importance of facts indicating the relationship is “marriage-like”). Some states, like 
New York, flat-out refuse to enforce implied agreements, see, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 
N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (N.Y. 1980) (“[W]e decline to recognize an action based upon an 
implied contract for personal services between unmarried persons living together.”); see 
also Scott, supra note 22, at 256 n.99 (citing Morone and other cases from different states 
that reject enforcement of implied agreements), while others just make such agreements 
difficult to prove, see Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and 
Legal Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 317 (2008) (noting that California appellate decisions 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2018) 
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from mainstream contract doctrine, which takes a more permissive 
view of contract enforcement.26 
Informal status approaches like the ALI Principles assign rights 
based on the relationship’s conformity to an amalgam of social, 
cultural, or legal standards that approximate marriage.27 This 
approach struggles to draw lines between those relationships that 
deserve regulation and those that do not. As the opening 
hypotheticals illustrate, nonmarital relationships are diverse. Within 
these relationships, partners may experience subjective feelings like 
attraction, love, and commitment, and they may engage in objective 
acts like caregiving, division of domestic labor, pooling of funds, and 
sexual intercourse. But the relationships need not involve all these 
things; neither, for that matter, does marriage, making the task of 
comparing the relationships particularly daunting. 
By drawing comparisons to marriage, both approaches tend to 
enshrine a traditional, middle-class ideal of intimate relationships 
typified by the breadwinner/homemaker model, ignoring changing 
norms as well as class and cultural differences.28 Moreover, both 
approaches only recognize inter se rights—obligations running 
between the partners. They leave off the table whether and how the 
law should recognize rights against the state or third parties, like 
standing to sue for wrongful death or favorable tax treatment.29 
These shortcomings stem in large part from misunderstandings 
or mistrust of consent. Consent is not a totemic concept that one must 
either accept or reject wholesale, but rather a conclusion about the 
nexus between subjective will, conduct, and consequence.30 Consent is 
also context-dependent. The imposition of general legal obligations 
on the citizenry requires a different type of consent, if any, than 
sexual contact or the performance of a medical procedure by a 
 
demonstrate “that the Marvin requirements have been strictly construed and that an 
award is by no means easy to obtain”). 
 26. See Thomas W. Joo, The Discourse of “Contract” and the Law of Marriage, in 24 
RESEARCH IN LAW & ECONOMICS: A JOURNAL OF POLICY 161, 162 (Dana L. Gold ed., 
2009) (“Both supporters and opponents of a ‘contractual’ approach to marriage law tend 
to use ‘contract’ to signify a market-libertarian normative view about the role of 
bargaining rather than to refer to the actual, more complex nature of contract law.”).  
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 165–67. 
 28. See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.  
 29. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different 
Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1126 (1981). 
 30. See Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT 55, 
57 (Frank Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (defining consent as “both a decision in 
favor of a proposed course of action and an authorization”—“a permission-giving act”). 
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physician.31 Consent’s role in the regulation of intimate relationships 
has received minimal attention.32 The requirement of consent has 
been parroted or brushed aside but not interrogated. 
In this Article, I explore, and ultimately defend, the role of 
consent in regulating informal relationships. I propose two 
methodological refinements for analyzing whether partners have 
consented to legal regulation based on their informal relationships. 
The first focuses on how to determine whether a party’s conduct 
justifies the state’s exercise of authority. The second focuses on how 
to define the object of consent. 
To answer the first question—when a person’s conduct justifies 
legal regulation—I draw lessons from the analysis of consent in 
contract doctrine. Courts and scholars have long struggled to 
reconcile the doctrinal ideal of consent33—“the master concept that 
defines the law of contracts in the United States”34—with the reality 
that parties will not contemplate or agree to all of the terms in their 
agreement35 and will inevitably be governed by background rules that 
they did not elect.36 The enforcement of every contract raises the 
question whether it is just, based on the commitments a party willed, 
to hold that party to commitments she did not expressly intend to 
make. Courts have developed doctrines to ensure that the agreements 
 
 31. See infra Section II.A. 
 32. The related concepts of autonomy and choice have received significant attention. 
For example, hundreds of articles have been written about the extent to which the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right of autonomous choice in the family realm to 
marry a same-sex spouse, to create or terminate a parent-child relationship, or to create 
other types of family relationships. Consent, on the other hand, is rarely discussed. Even 
articles that explicitly reference consent in their titles, see generally, Garrison, Is Consent 
Necessary?, supra note 25, do not spend much time defining the concept and tend to fall 
back on the concept of autonomy. 
 33. See Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 
1988 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139, 141–42 (describing consent as a central pillar of 
neoclassical contract theory that “is increasingly being seen as only one of a number of 
factors affecting contract-like liability”). 
 34. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994). 
 35. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 
628 (2002); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of 
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489–90 (1989) (describing background rules over which 
people do not typically bargain). 
 36. See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of 
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 730 (1990); Craswell, supra note 35, at 490; 
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World: 
What to Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete 
Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 323, 335–36. 
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reflect the parties’ broader goals37: they ensure a minimum level of 
mental competence and voluntariness to protect the parties’ will but 
then look to objective acts to establish assent to the key aspects of the 
transaction. Without certainty as to the central terms of the 
transaction, the law will not intervene. But once those key terms are 
sufficiently certain, the law will supply a range of background rules 
and missing terms even if the parties did not will or contemplate those 
terms.38 These rules enable courts to operationalize gradations of 
consent.39 
This textured approach to the concept of justification is the first 
step. The second is the identification of the relevant legal obligation. 
To answer the question “consent to what?”, we must disaggregate the 
legal obligations associated with marriage. Rarely will an informal 
relationship justify the imposition of all of marriage’s rights and 
obligations.40 To reflect the characteristics of varied relationships, 
packages of rights must be tailored according to the different 
functions the relationships serve for the partners and the state. 
Couples who provide each other with emotional support or request 
leave from employers to take care of each other but keep their 
finances separate, for example, might consent to provide caregiving41 
 
 37. The requirement of definiteness, for example, relieves parties of liability when 
they have not agreed to key terms. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: 
Exploring a New Basis for Contractual Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829, 1830 (2004) 
(“[A] communication is an offer—such that it can be accepted unilaterally—only if it is 
definite.”). The rule against enforcing agreements to agree is a variation on this 
requirement. Id. at 1829–30 (explaining that no liability arises between the parties while 
the agreement is being negotiated). One area in which these rules have arguably failed to 
protect parties is in dealing with contracts of adhesion. See Margaret Jane Radin, The 
Deformation of Contract in the Information Society, 37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 505, 517–
23 (2017) (discussing multiple approaches developed by courts to interpret “boilerplate” 
contracts of adhesion); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing 
Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 127, 132 (2017). 
 38. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 35, at 503–05 (noting that parties cannot possibly 
contemplate all of the rules governing their relationship, like rules governing “excuses, 
remedies, and other details of the promisor’s obligation,” and must therefore rely on 
background rules provided by the legal system).  
 39. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 37, at 1831 (suggesting that consent can be 
conceptualized as a consensus between parties that grows as negotiations continue). To be 
clear, although many of these doctrines are well settled, the role of consent in contract law 
writ large is not. See infra Section III.A. 
 40. See infra Section I.A.2 (discussing the ways in which cohabitation is similar and 
dissimilar to marriage). 
 41. Spousal-support obligations are reflected and encouraged in statutes like the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §	2601 (2016) (entitling employees to take 
reasonable leave to help care for a newborn or adopted child and to care for a child or 
spouse who has a serious health condition), and its state counterparts, as well as in 
common law doctrines that impose upon spouses a duty of support, see, e.g., Borelli v. 
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or to make end-of-life decisions, but not to divide property equally 
when the relationship comes to an end. Disaggregation calls attention 
to the things that matter—the functions themselves—rather than the 
relational proxy of marriage. 
Thinking of regulation within this framework of consent provides 
immediate and long-term payoffs. It suggests concrete reforms to the 
implied contract doctrine: courts looking for implied agreements too 
often analyze the parties’ conduct in the shadow of marriage and must 
instead consider whether the conduct justifies discrete obligations. It 
also suggests that informal status approaches should not analogize to 
marriage and impose rights and obligations in an all-or-nothing 
fashion. These approaches would be more effective if they focused on 
disaggregated commitments revolving around core functions like 
property sharing, childrearing, or emotional support. 
Looking toward the future, consent provides a heretofore 
missing foundation for proposals to regulate intimate relationships 
based on the functions they perform. Scholars calling for a functional 
approach—that like relationships should be treated alike—have 
struggled to explain when regulation should begin.42 Assuming the 
state wants to provide legal protections or impose responsibilities on 
those in informal relationships,43 it must decide when to do so without 
 
Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 18–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (citing numerous California 
cases that impose a duty of spousal support). 
 42. See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 224 (“After they have been living together 
for two years or have a child, a cohabiting couple should be treated by the law as though 
they were married.”); Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1143, 1148, 1156, 1159 (relying on 
cohabitation for different lengths of time depending on the government benefit); 
Waggoner, supra note 21, at 239–40 (treating a couple as married if they share a common 
household and are in a committed relationship). Nancy Polikoff has proposed entry 
requirements so capacious that they would almost certainly be rejected. See POLIKOFF, 
supra note 21, at 195. For example, she argues that “all those dependent in whole or part 
upon the deceased” should be able to sue for wrongful death. Id. 
 43. The purpose of this Article is to engage the courts and scholars that have 
attempted to recognize informal nonmarital relationships through contract or status 
approaches and to demonstrate why those approaches have gone astray. The analysis 
sheds light on the ways in which nonmarried partners live and how legal regulation could 
impact them. It therefore informs—but admittedly does not answer—the ultimate 
question whether the state should regulate people in informal relationships. The stakes of 
that question are high, as Professor Harry Krause presciently observed at the turn of the 
millennium: 
Socio-philosophers might ask themselves whether giving legal status to cohabitants 
is “progressive”—as the mostly liberal advocates insist it is—or whether it is in 
reality “reactionary”—as conservatives would generally deny? Instead of 
accepting and adapting to “modern lifestyles,” does the legalized cohabitation 
movement discourage out-of-wedlock cohabitation by making “free love” unfree? 
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the benefit of formal registration. Neglecting consent, proponents of 
functional approaches have struggled to answer this question. 
Approaching regulation through the lens of consent would encourage 
courts and legislators to articulate the relationship between the 
parties’ conduct and the imposition of legal obligations. Moreover, 
the narrower scope of obligation would result in a reduced cost of 
adjudicatory error. The eventual accretion of legal and social norms 
based on the salient characteristics of lived relationships could also 
aid both nonmarital partners and the state in making sense of 
informal relationships.44 Although the articulation of a functional 
regulatory system is beyond the scope of this Article, reckoning with 
consent is a necessary first step toward a more responsive, functional 
family law. 
I.  NONMARITAL RELATIONSHIPS AND LEGAL REGULATION 
This Part provides a descriptive account of nonmarital 
relationships. It considers both the subjective attitudes of people in 
nonmarital relationships and the way they structure their 
relationships. It then uses this descriptive account to contextualize the 
existing efforts to regulate informal relationships and to explain why 
those efforts have struggled. 
A. Understanding Nonmarital Relationships 
Tens of millions of adults in the United States have nonmarital 
partners.45 Their relationships vary in myriad ways, including attitudes 
 
At worst, does it resurrect the time-honored legal institution of “concubinage,” 
conferring on the “concubine” a legal status somewhere below that of a spouse? 
Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same Sex—Or Not at 
All?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 297–98 (2000). 
 44. For a discussion of norm deficits, see Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From 
Contract to Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 293, 360–62 (2015); Chiung-Ya Tang, Melissa Curran & Analisa Arroyo, 
Cohabitors’ Reasons for Living Together, Satisfaction with Sacrifices, and Relationship 
Quality, 50 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 598, 600 (2014).  
 45. For the purposes of this descriptive analysis, I use the term “partner” to refer 
broadly to people in nonmarital relationships. This term encompasses people who live 
together in intimate relationships and people in intimate relationships who live in separate 
households. However, much of the available data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau, in 
particular, the Current Population Survey, which focuses on people who self-identify as 
sharing a residence with a nonmarital partner, and the National Survey of Family Growth, 
which asks about cohabitation. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 1; NAT’L CTR. FOR 
HEALTH STATISTICS, NATIONAL SURVEY FOR FAMILY GROWTH 6, https://www.cdc.gov
/nchs/data/nsfg/nsfg_2013-15_malea_crq.pdf [http://perma.cc/87K6-LP2K]. When referring 
to these studies, I use the terms “cohabitation” and “cohabitants.” Although consent could 
theoretically ground the regulation of relationships involving people who intertwine their 
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toward cohabitation and marriage—for example, whether they view 
the relationship as permanent or temporary, exclusive or 
nonexclusive, a stepping stone to marriage or not—and the structure 
of the relationships—for example, whether they are raising children, 
whether they have been previously married or have children from 
previous marriages, whether one or both partners are in the 
workforce, the extent to which they have commingled their property 
or finances, and whether they have sexual relations. This Section 
reveals the tenuous relationship between subjective views and 
objective conduct. 
1.  Subjective Views 
Nonmarital partners hold differing views about the significance 
of their relationships. Social science research has focused on three 
dimensions—permanency, intimacy, and commitment—when 
assessing the strength of nonmarital relationships. 
Permanency. One important point of difference is whether 
partners see cohabitation as being permanent or temporary. Partners 
make predictions about whether their relationships will likely 
endure.46 These feelings may be reflected in their confidence about 
whether they will eventually marry47 or their ambivalence about 
wanting a future with their current partner.48 
 
lives in various ways but whose relationships are not defined by physical intimacy, like 
siblings, those relationships have not been studied in the same way and are therefore 
omitted from this descriptive account. 
 46. See Michael Pollard & Kathleen Mullan Harris, Cohabitation and Marriage 
Intensity: Consolidation, Intimacy, and Commitment, 17 tbl.1, 18 tbl.2 (RAND Labor & 
Population, Working Paper No. WR-1001, 2013), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand
/pubs/working_papers/WR1000/WR1001/RAND_WR1001.pdf [https://perma.cc/24HE-
BGLU] (comparing the average permanency of three different types of relationships—(1) 
couples who cohabitate, (2) married couples who cohabitated prior to marriage, and (3) 
married couples who did not cohabitate before marriage).  
 47. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW 
FAMILIES 78 (2010), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/11/pew-
social-trends-2010-families.pdf [https://perma.cc/84DJ-NEVR] (“As for the marital 
intentions of people who currently are cohabitating, 69% say they expect they will 
someday marry that person, 25% say they don’t expect to and 6% don’t know or would 
not answer.”). A 2013 National Center for Health Statistics study reported that 40% of 
first cohabitation transitioned to marriage within three years, 32% remained in a 
cohabiting relationship at the three-year mark, and 27% had dissolved. Casey E. Copen, 
Kimberly Daniels & William D. Mosher, First Premarital Cohabitation in the United States: 
2006-2010 National Survey of Family Growth, NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP. (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, Washington, D.C.) Apr. 2013 at 1.  
 48. Scott M. Stanley, Sarah W. Whitton & Howard J. Markman, Maybe I Do: 
Interpersonal Commitment and Premarital or Nonmarital Cohabitation, 25 J. FAM. ISSUES 
496, 512 (2004). 
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Intimacy. Intimacy refers to levels of “reported closeness, love, 
and satisfaction.”49 Studies of intimacy ask respondents to rate the 
“closeness” of their relationship or ask how much the respondents 
love their partner.50 They also analyze the partners’ motives for being 
with each other. For example, one intimacy study assessed whether 
the couples chose to live together for reasons related to spending 
more time together, reasons related to convenience, or reasons 
related to testing the relationship.51 In another study, respondents 
were asked to consider whether their family now is closer, less close, 
or the same level of closeness as their families were when they were 
growing up.52 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, recent studies have found that the 
motives for cohabiting can affect commitment and relationship 
quality. People who cohabit to spend time together also reveal higher 
levels of commitment and relationship satisfaction, and lower 
reported levels of ambivalence and conflict.53 
Commitment. Commitment is an amorphous concept that 
straddles the line between permanency and intimacy. It can measure 
the extent to which people perceive the relationship to be enduring,54 
as well as levels of emotional attachment to one’s partner.55 
Commitment may stem from a desire to be in the relationship and to 
maintain it in the future, what theorists call “dedication,” or from 
forces that make it difficult to leave the relationship regardless of 
one’s desires, such as structural or financial investments or social 
pressures, what theorists call “constraints.”56 Although not all 
constraints are subjectively perceived as constraining, financial and 
 
 49. Pollard & Harris, supra note 46, at 13. 
 50. Id. at 17–18, tbls.1–2 (Panel B). For a comparison of intimacy indicators between 
cohabitating respondents and married respondents, see id. at 17 tbl.1, 18 tbl.2 (illustrating 
that the rates for cohabitation are slightly lower than the rates for marriages of the same 
length). 
 51. Galena K. Rhoades, Scott M. Stanley & Howard J. Markman, Couples’ Reasons 
for Cohabitation: Associations with Individual Well-Being and Relationship Quality, 30 J. 
FAM. ISSUES 233, 246–47, 251 (2009). 
 52. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 47, at 49. 
 53. See Tang et al., supra note 44, at 615.  
 54. See, e.g., Pollard & Harris, supra note 46, at 17 tbl.1, 18 tbl.2 (grouping partners’ 
perceptions about the permanency of the relationship under the “commitment” category). 
 55. See Stanley et al., supra note 48, at 503–04 (calculating interpersonal commitment 
from four subscales related to emotional attachment, including the degree to which a 
person considered the relationship to be the most important thing in his life).  
 56. Galena K. Rhoades, Scott M. Stanley & Howard J. Markman, A Longitudinal 
Investigation of Commitment Dynamics in Cohabiting Relationships, 33 J. FAM. ISSUES 
369, 371 (2012). 
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structural investments, such as splitting the rent, are not highly 
correlated with dedication.57 
Commitment theorists have observed that individuals in close 
relationships move “from acting based on self-interest to acting based 
on preferences for joint outcomes.”58 This transformation involves the 
development of “we-ness,” where “one’s partner’s satisfactions and 
dissatisfactions become more and more identified with one’s own.”59 
The level of dedication affects the extent to which one partner will 
place the interests of the other partner or the relationship over his or 
her immediate self-interests, and the way the partner will perceive the 
sacrifice as satisfying or harmful.60 Scientists have identified different 
measures of dedication, including the importance of the relationship 
relative to anything else in life; whether the respondent would want to 
be with his partner in a few years; whether the respondent thought of 
his partner in terms of “us” and “we” rather than “me” and “her”; 
and whether he wanted the relationship to stay strong regardless of 
“rough times.”61 
 
*     *     * 
As I will demonstrate in Section I.B, existing regulatory 
approaches to informal relationships value these subjective views. 
They assume that legal intervention is unnecessary when the partners 
are just trying out their relationship but seek to reward dedication 
and other indicators of permanency, intimacy, and commitment. That 
the law should reward these subjective views begs the question of how 
to identify when one or both partners hold them. 
 
 57. Id.; see also id. at 375–76 (reporting that dedication scores and a checklist of 
twenty-five external factors revealing constraint were “not significantly correlated”); id. at 
384 (noting that constraints made it harder to break up regardless of the intrinsic desire to 
be together). This finding suggests that behavior often taken as a signal of subjective 
dedication may not always indicate a person’s subjective feelings about the relationship. 
 58. Scott M. Stanley, Galena K. Rhoades & Sarah W. Whitton, Commitment: 
Functions, Formation, and the Securing of Romantic Attachment, 2 J. FAM. THEORY & 
REV. 243, 244 (2010). 
 59. Id. (quoting George Levinger, A Social Exchange View on the Dissolution of Pair 
Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE IN DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIPS 175 (Robert L. 
Burgess & Ted L. Huston eds., 1979)). 
 60. Id. at 246. 
 61. Stanley et al., supra note 48, at 503. Participants were asked to rate their 
agreement with the four dedication measures on a scale of one to five with one indicating 
strong disagreement, three indicating neutrality, and five indicating strong agreement. Id. 
at 503. The mean aggregated score for cohabitants was 15.74, suggesting an average 
response of nearly four (“agree”). Id. at 506. The mean aggregated score for married 
couples was 18.09. Id. 
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2.  Objective Realities 
The law has treated objective acts as proxies for the partners’ 
subjective views. This Section identifies those proxies and challenges 
the link between them and the views they supposedly represent. 
Financial interdependence. Courts and scholars have treated the 
pooling of finances as an important factor determining the duties 
couples owe each other upon dissolution of their relationships.62 
Commingling property can provide insights into the ways in which the 
partners may have viewed their relationship.63 Pooling of finances, in 
the form of joint accounts or shared property ownership, may suggest 
a willingness to pursue collective interests instead of individual ones, 
which could indicate the subjective belief that the relationship is 
permanent or a greater commitment to a future together.64 It may also 
indicate greater confidence in the quality or stability of the 
relationship.65 
Social scientists have found that approximately half of cohabiting 
couples keep their finances separate. One study found that 45.7% of 
cohabiting couples maintain separate finances.66 That study is 
consistent with another study that concluded that 52% of cohabitants 
shared income in a common pot.67 Although cohabitants who 
maintain joint accounts may enjoy higher relationship quality than 
 
 62. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §	6.03(7)(b)–(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (identifying “[t]he extent to 
which the parties intermingled their finances” and “[t]he extent to which their relationship 
fostered the parties’ economic interdependence” as factors revealing a shared life); 
Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21, at 61–69 (citing various cases in which the courts 
examined the degree to which cohabitants commingled their funds). 
 63. I use conditional language here because commingling property does not 
necessarily suggest commitment or intimacy. A couple may pool resources due to the 
scarcity or expense of housing or other practical considerations. See Fiona Rose-
Greenland & Pamela J. Smock, Living Together Unmarried: What Do We Know About 
Cohabiting Families?, in HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 255, 264 (Gary W. 
Peterson & Kevin R. Bush eds., 2013) (noting an interview study conducted in New York 
which concluded that a majority of respondents cohabited due to finances, convenience, or 
changes in their housing situation instead of a desire to try out marriage). And partners 
who keep their finances separate might nonetheless consider themselves deeply 
committed. 
 64. See Fenaba R. Addo & Sharon Sassler, Financial Arrangements and Relationship 
Quality in Low-Income Couples, 59 FAM. REL. 408, 410–11 (2010). 
 65. Id. at 411, 417 (suggesting this hypothesis but only finding support for it among 
women but not men). 
 66. Kristen R. Heimdal & Sharon K. Houseknecht, Cohabitating and Married 
Couples’ Income Organization: Approaches in Sweden and the United States, 65 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 525, 533 (2003). 
 67. Catherine Kenny, Cohabitating Couple, Filing Jointly? Resource Pooling and U.S. 
Poverty Policies, 53 FAM. REL. 237, 243 (2004). 
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those who do not,68 pooling does not always reflect “we-ness.” When 
couples pool money, the ways in which they contribute can vary. A 
couple may regard household money as “nebulous and not formally 
monitored or accountable” or may think of contributions as separate, 
either as “‘equal contributions’ or going ‘half and half.’”69 The former 
system has been called “joint pooling” and indicates that the couple 
operates as a single economic unit; the latter is called “partial 
pooling” and is based on the idea that the partners operate 
autonomously.70 Cohabitants are more likely than married couples to 
fall within the latter system and to view pooled funds as “separate, 
individual, calculable, and directly accountable.”71 When higher 
earning partners subsidize the lower earner, both partners understand 
the practice as a form of generosity and a departure from the ideal of 
an equal contribution model.72 
Economic dependency. Relatedly, scholars have focused on the 
ways in which the couple’s labor-market participation contributes to 
dependency. Although in a majority of marriages, both spouses 
participate in the labor force, the male-breadwinner-female-
homemaker model and the economic dependency that it creates has 
not entirely disappeared. One justification for the creation of inter se 
obligations between nonmarital partners has been to remediate this 
dependency.73 Scholars have speculated about the extent to which 
cohabitation may be a more gender-egalitarian institution than 
marriage, especially regarding partners’ labor participation and 
dependency, or whether it follows the patterns of marriage.74 
Data from the U.S. Census Bureau indicate that out of 8,075,000 
unmarried opposite-sex couples in 2016, 5,331,000, or 66%, were both 
in the labor force.75 In almost 19% of couples, only the male partner 
 
 68. See Addo & Sassler, supra note 64, at 419 (“Couples practicing independent 
money management report lower levels of relationship satisfaction.”). 
 69. Carolyn Vogler, Cohabiting Couples: Rethinking Money in the Household at the 
Beginning of the Twenty First Century, 53 SOC. REV. 1, 18 (2005). 
 70. Carolyn Vogler, Michaela Brockmann & Richard D. Wiggins, Managing Money in 
New Heterosexual Forms of Intimate Relationships, 37 J. SOCIO-ECON. 552, 565 (2008). 
 71. Vogler, supra note 69, at 18. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See, e.g., Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 828–29 (discussing 
dependency-creation rationale in the context of marital obligations). 
 74. See generally Vogler, supra note 69 (examining how couples organize finances to 
assess the different ways in which cohabitation can remediate and simultaneously 
reproduce traditional gender inequalities). 
 75. See America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/families/cps-2016.html [http://perma.cc/J5HV-
893A] (last modified Apr. 6, 2017) (follow “Table UC1. Opposite Sex Unmarried Couples 
By Labor Force Status Of Both Partners: 2016” hyperlink).  
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was in the labor force; in 7% of couples, only the female partner was 
in the labor force.76 This compares to the 51% of married couple 
family groups with both spouses in the labor force, 22% in which only 
the husband was in the labor force, and the almost 8% in which only 
the wife was in the labor force.77 These figures indicate higher levels 
of joint participation in the labor force by cohabiting couples, 
although the differences could be explained in part by the 
significantly higher percentage of married couples with neither spouse 
in the labor force.78 In terms of gender, husbands are more likely than 
men in cohabiting relationships to be the sole worker, although the 
difference is not particularly stark. 
Raising children. Although a robust body of scholarship 
addresses questions about the rights and duties running between 
nonmarital partners and their children,79 less attention has been paid 
to how the presence of a child changes the horizontal relationship 
between adult partners. As of 2015, of the 8.4 million opposite-sex 
cohabiting households, approximately 3.3 million, or just under forty 
percent, have a child under the age of eighteen.80 Roughly half of the 
children in cohabiting households are the biological children of the 
couple as opposed to only one of the partners.81 
The presence of children may lead to behaviors associated with 
commitment, although that commitment may take the form of 
dedication or constraint.82 A caregiver may be less likely to make 
 
 76. See id. 
 77. See America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/families/cps-2016.html [http://perma.cc/J5HV-
893A] (last modified Apr. 6, 2017) (follow “Table FG2 Married Couple Family Groups, 
By Family Income, and Labor Force Status of Both Spouses: 2016” hyperlink). 
 78. The data are not broken down by age, but the higher percentages of married 
couples out of the workforce likely reflect higher percentages of retired couples. 
 79. See generally CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW 
UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014) (discussing the ways in which the law 
influences families, including through regulation, indirect regulation, and social norms); 
Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21 (discussing the financial and custodial obligations 
underlying the legal treatment of nonmarriage); Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family 
Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 173 (2015) 
(proposing greater legal rights and responsibilities for unmarried coparents). 
 80. Heidi Glenn, No, You’re Not in a Common Law Marriage After 7 Years Together, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 4, 2016, 8:12 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/09/04/487825901/no
-you-re-not-in-a-common-law-marriage-after-7-years-of-dating [http://perma.cc/A9TC-
K98H (dark archive)] (summarizing U.S. Census Bureau statistics). 
 81. See Rose-Greenland & Smock, supra note 63, at 262. 
 82. See Rhoades et al., supra note 56, at 371 (“Dedication and constraint commitment 
are sometimes associated, as one may choose to become more constrained because he or 
she feels dedicated and behaviors undertaken because of dedication may lead to increased 
constraints in the future.”). 
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decisions in his or her own interests, for example, by forgoing better 
professional opportunities.83 Scholars have noted that where one 
party disproportionately provides the caregiving, the caregiver 
experiences market penalties in the form of lost wages and lower 
retirement benefits while the non-caregiver earns higher wages than 
they otherwise would.84 The data suggest that couples with children 
are more likely to have a partner withdraw from the labor force: 
69.6% of partners without children are both in the labor force, in 
comparison to 60% of partners with children.85 A higher percentage 
of men in cohabiting relationships with children will be in the labor 
force relative to those without children: 88.6% to 82.6%.86 In contrast, 
a lower percentage of women in cohabiting relationships with 
children will be in the labor force when compared to women without 
children: 67.6% to 76.8%.87 Moreover, women with children are less 
likely to earn high salaries than women without, and somewhat less 
likely to out-earn their male partners.88 
Partners with children are also somewhat more likely to 
contribute to a shared household, which, as discussed above, can 
indicate greater commitment.89 A U.K. study of the way cohabiting 
couples allocate money concluded that “cohabiting parents were very 
similar to married respondents . . . in being most likely to use [a] 
system in which households operated more or less as single economic 
units,	. . . whereas respondents in childless cohabiting unions stood 
 
 83. See Cynthia Lee Starnes, Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and 
Co-Parenting Commitments, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 203 (2012) (noting the “common case” 
where the “mother earns much less than the father, primarily because her role as primary 
family caregiver compromised her investment in the workplace” and proposing greater 
post-dissolution financial support of a coparent based on a shared-parenting 
commitment). 
 84. See Merle H. Weiner, Caregiver Payments and the Obligation to Give Care or 
Share, 59 VILL. L. REV. 135, 149–50 (2014). 
 85. America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/families/cps-2016.html [http://perma.cc/J5HV-
893A] (follow “Table UC3. Opposite Sex Unmarried Couples by Presence of Biological 
Children under 18, and Age, Earnings, Education, and Race and Hispanic Origin of Both 
Partners: 2016” hyperlink).  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. For example, only 42,000 women with children earn over $100,000, in 
comparison to 173,000 women without children. See id. Twenty-three percent of women 
with children out-earn their male partners, as compared to 27.7% of women without 
children. See id. 
 89. See, e.g., Vogler, supra note 69, at 17 (“Whereas single couples who have a 
biological child together appear to handle money in broadly similar ways to married 
parents nubile and post-marital couples appear to handle money rather differently from 
married couples.” (citation omitted)). 
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out as being far more likely to keep money partly or completely 
separate.”90 The study found, for instance, that 52% of cohabiting 
parents operated a “joint pooling” system, in which couples pool all 
their money, usually in a joint bank account, and each takes money as 
needed, in comparison to 59% of married parents and 39% of 
cohabitants without children.91 Only 34% of cohabiting parents used 
an individualized financial system, in which partners keep much of 
their finances separate, in comparison to the 61% of cohabitants 
without children.92 
Cutting in the other direction, “shotgun cohabitations,” 
cohabitations beginning after conception but before childbirth,93 are 
on the rise. A recent study found that 18.1% of women who were 
unmarried and non-cohabiting at conception were cohabiting at birth, 
as compared to the 5.3% who married.94 The imminent arrival of a 
child encourages hastily arranged unions, which in turn “may be 
poorly-matched, of low quality, and at greatest risk of dissolution,”95 
and seem more likely to match the description of “convenience 
reasons” for cohabiting that lead to lower levels of commitment and 
intimacy.96 Sociologists Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas have shown 
that women whose partners move in because of the birth of a child 
often do not marry because they do not want to link their financial 
fates to those of their partners, or because they do not trust that their 
partner will be fully committed to the relationship.97 
Previous relationships. Another feature of most cohabiting 
relationships is that at least one partner has previously been 
married.98 This may affect attitudes about commitment or the 
permanency of their relationship and may also affect other structural 
considerations. For example, cohabitation can be grounds for 
termination of support obligations, which can affect the way partners 
 
 90. Vogler et al., supra note 70, at 567 tbl.11. 
 91. See id. at 565, 567 tbl.11. 
 92. See id. at 565–66, 567 tbl.11 (categorizing the partial pooling and independent 
management systems as individualized systems). 
 93. Daniel T. Lichter, Sharon Sassler & Richard N. Turner, Cohabitation, Post-
Conception Unions, and the Rise in Nonmarital Fertility, 47 SOC. SCI. RES. 134, 135 (2014); 
see also Heather Rackin & Christina M. Gibson-Davis,	The Role of Pre- and 
Postconception Relationships for First-Time Parents, 74	J. MARRIAGE & FAM.	526, 527 
(2012). 
 94. Lichter et al., supra note 93, at 140 tbl.3. 
 95. Id. at 136 (citation omitted). 
 96. See Rhoades et al., supra note 56, at 240 tbl.1. 
 97. KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR 
WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 111–14 (2005). 
 98. BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 117. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2018) 
1034 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
structure their living arrangements, engage in intimacy, and pool their 
resources.99 The presence of children from previous relationships, 
whether marital or nonmarital, may impact a partner’s willingness to 
tie his or her financial well-being to someone with preexisting support 
obligations. Children may also provide an incentive to draw clear 
lines between partners’ separate property to pass it on to their 
respective children.100 These considerations are especially likely to 
arise for older cohabitants. Ninety percent of adults over the age of 
fifty-one who cohabit—a little over one million individuals—were 
previously married.101 Retirees and surviving spouses must also 
navigate concerns about the effect of subsequent relationships on 
pensions and other financial matters.102 
Cohabitation. The vast majority of studies discussed in this 
Section assume the importance of living together under the same 
roof. This assumption is reflected in the law. Policy proposals 
targeting nonmarital relationships, like the ALI Principles, tend to 
focus on people who are cohabiting.103 
Yet the focus on co-residential couples ignores LATs—“a 
monogamous intimate partnership between unmarried individuals 
who live in separate homes but identify themselves as a committed 
couple.”104 Recent studies indicate that between six to twelve percent 
of adults in the U.S. are in LAT relationships,105 potentially greater 
than the percentage who report cohabiting.106 The research also 
 
 99. See Aloni, supra note 6, at 1315–20 (examining the cohabitation-termination 
doctrine); Antognini, supra note 20, at 21–30 (discussing how courts define and assess the 
nonmarital relationship when terminating domestic support payments). 
 100. See, e.g., Benson & Coleman, supra note 5, at 798, 803. 
 101. See Rose-Greenland & Smock, supra note 63, at 262. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §	6.03(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2002); see also §	6.03(1) cmt. c (calling the 
sharing of a primary residence a “threshold requirement”). 
 104. Benson & Coleman, supra note 5, at 797; see also Susan Frelich Appleton, 
Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1453, 1491 (2014) 
(defining LATs and noting that LATs would be classified as “single” under conventional 
studies). 
 105. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, How Should the Law Treat Couples Who Live Apart 
Together?, 29 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. (Cornell Law Sch., Research Paper No. 17-43) 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 16), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3048340 [https://perma.cc/HS6T-9RW6] (reporting 9% of respondents in a national 
survey and 12% of respondents in a New York survey (percentages rounded to the next 
highest or lowest whole number)); Charles Q. Strohm et al., “Living Apart Together” 
Relationships in the United States, 21 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 177, 190 (2009) (reporting 
figures of 7% of women and 6% of men in the United States that are in a LAT 
relationship). 
 106. See Berenson, supra note 5, at 311 (citing Strohm et al., supra note 105, at 190). 
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reveals a preference among some older adults for the LAT model. As 
noted above, older adults are more likely to be previously partnered, 
which can affect the way they structure their relationships.  
Research on LATs indicates that people who do not live under 
the same roof can enjoy high levels of commitment and emotional 
support.107 Within this category, there is variation: one qualitative 
study from the U.K. observed that despite high reported levels of 
overall commitment, LATs could be divided into four categories: 
those who lived apart (1) because of preference about living alone; 
(2) based on constraints or circumstances; (3) because it was too early 
in the relationship to live together; and (4) based on a desire for less 
commitment.108 Unsurprisingly, individuals in the first two categories 
reported the highest levels of commitment, reporting joint decision 
making and the sharing of confidences, hobbies, interests, and 
expenses.109 Studies of older LATs indicate that they desire intimacy, 
including physical and emotional support, without the legal obligation 
to provide financial support or caregiving.110 Many reported the 
avoidance of structural commitments as a benefit of the arrangement: 
they could “maintain or establish autonomy via the continuance of 
roles[,] . . . traditions/rituals[,] . . . and hobbies that predated the 
LAT relationship.”111 But respondents indicated that they felt fully 
committed on an emotional level, although their feelings of 
commitment did not translate to beliefs about the permanence of 
their relationships.112 
The existence of LATs confirms that living under the same roof 
is yet another proxy for subjective attributes. Conversely, people may 
cohabit without feelings of permanency, intimacy, or commitment. 
 
 107. See id. (reviewing studies); see also Bowman, supra note 105, at 28 (reporting that 
a plurality of LATs would turn to their partner first—as compared to friends or family 
members—if emotionally upset). 
 108. Julia Carter et al., Sex, Love and Security: Accounts of Distance and Commitment 
in Living Apart Together Relationships, 50 SOC. 576, 584 (2015); see also Bowman, supra 
note 105, at 25 tbl.10, 26 fig.1 (surveying reasons for living apart and identifying responses 
across a similar spectrum). 
 109. See Carter et al., supra note 108, at 584–87. 
 110. See Benson & Coleman, supra note 5, at 802–03. The findings of the Benson and 
Coleman experiment reflect findings of studies conducted in other industrialized nations. 
See id. at 798 (collecting studies). 
 111. Id. at 802. 
 112. See id. at 808. 
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Cohabiting relationships fizzle out, with intimacy ending while the 
parties still live together.113 
Sex and exclusivity. Sex is another important proxy for subjective 
attitudes. Sexual activity is central to the law’s recognition of intimate 
adult relationships.114 It is often a touchstone for whether the law will 
recognize a nonmarital relationship, either for awarding rights115 or 
terminating them.116 Commitment scholars have associated sexual 
exclusivity with relationship commitment and intimacy.117 Exclusivity 
can signal “greater motivation for, and investment in, pleasing the 
partner in a variety of ways, including sexually.”118 Scholars interpret 
its absence as an indication of lack of commitment.119 Sexual activity 
is treated as a marker of a healthy relationship and is often included 
in measures of relationship quality. The assumption appears to be 
that sex accompanies love and closeness. 
Studies generally reveal that married and cohabiting couples 
report having sex equally frequently and with similar levels of sexual 
satisfaction.120 Although married individuals engage in extramarital 
sex,121 studies indicate that people in nonmarital relationships are less 
likely than people in marriages to be sexually exclusive.122  
It is worth noting that while sex and exclusivity may indicate 
intimacy and commitment, they also occur within relationships that 
 
 113. See, e.g., Fleming v. Spencer, 110 Wash. App. 1017, 2002 WL 171249, at *1–2 
(Wash. App. Feb. 4, 2002) (unpublished) (involving a couple who ended physical intimacy 
two years before the parties ceased cohabiting). 
 114. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 145–50 (1995). 
 115. See, e.g., Fleming, 2002 WL 171249, at *2–5 (finding that a meretricious 
relationship ended when a couple ceased to be intimate even though they continued to live 
together for several more years); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §	6.03(7)(h) (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (making the 
existence of “physical intimacy” relevant to whether partners “share a life together”). 
 116. See Antognini, supra note 20, at 24–25 (noting the importance of sex to the 
determination of whether to terminate alimony). 
 117. Carter et al., supra note 108, at 578.  
 118. Stanley et al., supra note 48, at 513. 
 119. See Heather D. Hill, Steppin’ Out: Infidelity and Sexual Jealousy Among 
Unmarried Parents, in UNMARRIED COUPLES WITH CHILDREN 104, 108 (Paula England 
& Kathryn Edin eds., 2007). 
 120. See Stanley et al., supra note 48, at 506 tbl.1 (showing spouses averaging 4.41 on a 
Likert-type scale for sexual satisfaction in comparison to 4.13 for cohabitations); id. at 507 
(“For analysis of sexual frequency, there was no significant effect for relationship status.”). 
 121. See Adaora A. Adimora, Victor J. Schoenbach & Irene A. Doherty, Concurrent 
Sexual Partnerships Among Men in the United States, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2230, 2230 
(2007) (finding that more than one in ten men is involved in concurrent relationships). 
 122. Id. at 2336; see also Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 841 n.100 
(collecting sources). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2018) 
2018] CONSENT TO INTIMATE REGULATION 1037 
neither the partners nor outside observers would characterize as 
serious. Moreover, many of the other structural attributes of 
nonmarital relationships do not depend on sex: people can still pool 
income and property, make professional sacrifices, and name each 
other as beneficiaries of life insurance policies without having a 
sexual relationship. Most subjective attitudes, like commitment, 
permanency, and emotional closeness likewise can arise in non-sexual 
relationships.123 
 
*     *     * 
The structural attributes discussed in this Section illustrate why 
social scientists have characterized nonmarital relationships as 
essentially heterogeneous124 and lacking in institutional norms.125 
About half of cohabiting partners pool their finances while half do 
not. Most pursue opportunities in the labor market, but some live in 
single-earner households. Many have been in previous relationships, 
but those that have may be old or young and may have dependent 
children, adult children, or no children. The category of cohabitation 
itself is over- and under-inclusive, leaving out people whose 
relationships bear many other hallmarks of closeness because they do 
not live under the same roof while including relationships that no 
longer perform many of the desired functions. Additionally, these 
objective indicia do not always correspond to the subjective views 
they are supposed to represent. The pooling of income, for example, 
may not reflect commitment when the partners mentally segregate 
their contributions. Partners who choose not to live together may still 
have strong feelings of intimacy or commitment. 
3.  Demographic Variations 
The variations just discussed cut across demographic groups. 
However, they tend to coalesce in distinct patterns around class and 
 
 123. See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 
59 EMORY L.J. 809, 850–54 (2010) (noting the potential benefits of separating sex from 
intimacy); cf. Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. 303, 350–53 
(2014) (looking at and critiquing laws—like marriage’s consummation requirement—that 
require sex).  
 124. See, e.g., Rose-Greenland & Smock, supra note 63, at 256 (“Along with the 
increased focus on diversity in cohabitors has come recognition that there is diversity in 
forms of cohabitation, or the cohabiting family itself.” (citations omitted)).  
 125. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me, Bill: Should 
Cohabitation Be the (Legal) Default Option?, 64 LA. L. REV. 403, 407–08 (2004). 
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race.126 Wealthier, better educated adults tend to marry each other 
and have children within the marriage.127 Studies have found that 
higher male earnings have a positive effect on marriage, the transition 
between cohabitation and marriage, and childbirth within marriage.128 
Higher education levels for women also have a positive effect on 
marriage rates.129 
In contrast, less wealthy and less educated adults are more likely 
to be in comparatively unstable relationships. One study found that 
“[i]n 2010, 58 percent of first births to women with either a high 
school degree or some college were out of wedlock, while for those 
with a college degree, the comparable statistic was only 12 percent.”130 
The relationships of unmarried parents are much less likely to 
survive. Data from The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study131 
demonstrate that by the time their children were five years old, only 
one-third of unmarried couples were still together, in comparison to 
eighty percent of their married counterparts.132 Moreover, a 
significant percentage of these parents go on to have children with 
different men and women, resulting in what sociologists call 
“multiparent fertility.”133 
Sociologists like Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas have shown 
that people in unstable relationships do not reject marriage. Rather, 
they idealize marriage as something they want to do when they are 
ready—something they want to do right.134 Edin and Kefalas point out 
that given the prevalence of problems such as “domestic abuse, 
chronic infidelity, alcoholism or drug addiction, repeated 
 
 126. See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 97, at 1–26; ISABEL V. SAWHILL, GENERATION 
UNBOUND: DRIFTING INTO SEX AND PARENTHOOD WITHOUT MARRIAGE 65–70 (2014) 
(examining the impacts of social class on decisions regarding marriage and childbearing).  
 127. See RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? HOW THE 
AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE 27 (2011); SAWHILL, 
supra note 126, at 79. 
 128. See Marcia Carlson, Sara McLanahan & Paula England, Union Formation in 
Fragile Families, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 237, 239 (2004) (summarizing studies). 
 129. See id. at 250, 255 (summarizing findings from the Fragile Families study data). 
 130. See SAWHILL, supra note 126, at 70.  
 131. For information about this longitudinal study of “nearly 5,000 children born in 
large U.S. cities between 1998 and 2000,” see About the Fragile Families and Child 
Wellbeing Study, THE FRAGILE FAMILIES & CHILD WELLBEING STUDY, 
https://fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/about [https://perma.cc/TLP3-3HFV]. 
 132. SAWHILL, supra note 126, at 70–71.  
 133. See id. 
 134. EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 97, at 106–09; see also BANKS, supra note 127, at 
25–26.  
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incarceration, or a living made from crime” in the low-income 
population, their reluctance to marry “might be quite reasonable.”135 
African Americans have felt the marriage decline particularly 
acutely. Black women are half as likely to marry as white women, and 
black spouses are nearly twice as likely as white spouses to divorce.136 
These differences cannot be explained by class alone, as disparities 
persist even into the middle and upper-middle classes.137 Ralph 
Richard Banks identifies a complicated alchemy of factors that have 
contributed to the decline of marriage among the black middle class, 
including a shortage of eligible men,138 a refusal on the part of women 
to “settle” for lower earning men,139 and the complicated dynamics of 
interracial relationships.140 
Whatever the causes, these findings identify a further challenge 
for regulatory policy: the potential for disparate impacts across class 
and race. As marriage stratifies, rules targeting informal relationships 
are increasingly likely to impact people with lower education and less 
wealth, or who come from certain racial groups. Put another way, 
rules designed to enforce joint financial obligations or to redistribute 
property between higher- and lower-income individuals141 fit less 
comfortably in a world where the wealthy and well educated are 
likely to marry each other and in which nonmarital couples may have 
few assets and more liabilities.142 
B. Regulatory Attempts 
The great variation in relationships described in this Part makes 
it difficult to identify when legal rights and obligations should begin. 
Attempts to regulate nonmarital relationships must explain whether 
the partners’ subjective views are ever relevant to the imposition of 
obligations, and, if so, which ones. Regardless of the law’s position 
about subjective views, it must also identify the objective conduct that 
 
 135. EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 97, at 216, 217. 
 136. BANKS, supra note 127, at 7–8.  
 137. See id. at 9. 
 138. See id. at 29–48. 
 139. See id. at 83–102. 
 140. See id. passim. 
 141. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122–23 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) 
(recognizing express and implied agreements between cohabitants, in this case a 
homemaker and a movie star).  
 142. See SAWHILL, supra note 126, at 75–76 (noting that, in the past, “doctors married 
nurses and CEOs married their secretaries, and even when a highly educated man married 
a highly educated woman, the woman was unlikely to work,” although that is no longer 
the case).  
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will trigger legal obligations. Existing approaches fail these daunting 
challenges. 
As discussed above, one approach involves the recognition of 
contractual or equitable rights between unmarried cohabitants. This 
approach is commonly associated with Marvin v. Marvin,143 a 
landmark decision by the Supreme Court of California. The Marvin 
court discarded public policy objections to the creation of enforceable 
obligations between cohabitants and held that agreements not resting 
on “meretricious consideration” could be enforced.144 In the forty 
years following the Marvin decision, nearly all states began to accept 
some form of contracting between cohabitants.145 
If the challenge is to identify when individual preferences should 
give rise to enforceable obligations, a contract approach would seem 
ideal.146 But courts have struggled to implement the approach for 
several reasons. First, as critics of Marvin have pointed out, “[p]eople 
don’t generally make formal contracts about either the conduct of 
their relationship or the consequences that ought to flow in the event 
they end it.”147 They might be uninterested in arms-length bargaining 
or incapable of achieving that self-interested distance.148 
Second, courts have struggled to identify a workable standard for 
ascertaining the parties’ subjective preferences and determining when 
those preferences should justify legal obligations. Where the parties 
have failed to enter an express agreement, courts must infer terms 
from the parties’ conduct, which is largely an indeterminate inquiry 
and gives courts license to impose their own ideas about fairness, 
threatening the legitimacy of the process and dishonoring the 
preferences of the parties.149 Agreements between cohabitants 
frequently claim broad obligations based on the relationship as a 
 
 143. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 106. 
 144. Id. at 109–10. 
 145. See BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 47–48 (noting that all but three states recognize 
some form of agreements between cohabitants). A notable exception is Illinois: within the 
last year, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule, articulated in Hewitt v. Hewitt, 
394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979), that “disfavor[s] private contractual alternatives to marriage or 
the grant of property rights to unmarried cohabitants.” Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 
834, 852 (Ill. 2016) (citations omitted). 
 146. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1989). 
 147. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, Inventing Family Law, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 874 
(1999). 
 148. See Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1365, 1373 (2001); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the 
Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1832 (1985). 
 149. See Ellman, supra note 147, at 874–75; Ellman, supra note 146, at 20–23. 
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whole.150 Marvin itself involved sweeping allegations—that the parties 
would pool their earnings, share equally in all property acquired, and 
provide support—based on the way the parties had lived their lives 
for seven years.151 Indeed, without proof of discrete commitments, 
courts have looked to conduct suggesting the broad commitment to 
live like a married couple.152 Courts in states recognizing implied 
agreements have generally been hostile to these claims.153 When 
assessing the conduct giving rise to a party’s claims, courts will often 
draw comparisons to an idealized view of marriage and find those 
relationships wanting.154 In short, when contracts enter the intimate 
realm, contract doctrine developed in other areas no longer seems to 
apply. 
An alternative approach is to regulate partners who stand in a 
status relationship to each other. This approach focuses on the nature 
of a cohabiting relationship rather than the parties’ commitments 
when parceling out marriage-like rights.155 
Thus far, a few courts have endorsed a status-based approach to 
nonmarital regulation.156 Most famously, the State of Washington 
grants legal rights to partners in committed intimate relationships, 
formerly called “meretricious relationships,”157 when the parties 
cohabit in a “stable, marital-like relationship . . . with knowledge that 
 
 150. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 147, at 874–75 (describing the problem as ascertaining 
broad commitments “about the consequences of dissolution” from “conduct during a 
relationship”). 
 151. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). In Marvin, the 
plaintiff pleaded the existence of an express agreement, but the court allowed her to 
amend her complaint to add theories of implied contract or equitable relief based on the 
same conduct. See id. 
 152. See Antognini, supra note 20, at 10–11. 
 153. See BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 50–53. Even Michelle Marvin, on remand, failed 
to establish the existence of an agreement, express or implied, and ended up with nothing. 
Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558–59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see Ann Laquer Estin, 
Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1382 (2001) (detailing what 
occurred after the remand). 
 154. See, e.g., Taylor v. Fields, 224 Cal. Rptr. 186, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting 
the existence of a valid agreement between a decedent and his sexual partner of forty-two 
years because they never lived together); see also Antognini, supra note 20, at 8–9; Estin, 
supra note 153, at 1402–03 (noting that “[o]nly a small percentage of cohabitants will have 
even a possibility of legal recovery when their relationships end”). 
 155. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1163–70. 
 156. Those two states are Alaska and Washington. See Boulds v. Nielsen, 323 P.3d 58, 
62–63 (Alaska 2014); Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995) (en banc). 
Several Oregon intermediate appellate decisions also take a status approach. See, e.g., 
Shuraleff v. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764, 768 (Or. Ct. App. 1991). 
 157. See Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 350 n.1 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). 
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a lawful marriage between them does not exist.”158 Courts examine 
factors including “continuous cohabitation, duration of the 
relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and 
services for joint projects, and the intent of the parties” to determine 
the relationship’s existence.159 If found to exist, courts will make a 
“just and equitable distribution of the property” that would have 
been community property if the couple married.160 It is unclear how 
frequently committed-intimate-relationship claims arise, but the low 
number of published appellate decisions suggests that actions are 
correspondingly rare. 
That said, the status approach has found favor with influential 
legal scholars. For example, the ALI Principles propose that a couple 
sharing a primary residence for a continuous period of time will be 
presumptively entitled to the division of property acquired during the 
course of the cohabiting relationship and, if applicable, compensatory 
payments after the relationship comes to an end.161 One can rebut the 
presumption by demonstrating that the parties did not share a life 
together based on the consideration of various factors, including (1) 
statements regarding their relationship, (2) the extent to which they 
intermingled their finances, (3) the extent to which their relationship 
fostered economic dependency, (4) whether they assumed specialized 
or collaborative roles in furtherance of their life together, (5) their 
emotional or physical intimacy, and (6) their reputation in the 
community.162 However, a significant number of lengthy cohabitations 
would result in property and support obligations running between the 
partners. 
The status approach discounts the subjective preferences of the 
parties. Proponents, like Cynthia Bowman, have characterized these 
proposals as imposing obligations on couples “without their 
 
 158. Connell, 898 P.2d at 834. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 835. “Alaska, like Washington, provides for marital-like property 
distribution following a cohabitative relationship.” Boulds, 323 P.3d at 62–63. Alaska 
courts use similar factors to the Washington courts to determine whether the parties 
intended to create a partnership. See id. at 63. However, that determination does not 
automatically result in marital property-like rights. See id. at 64. Rather, the courts will 
examine whether the parties intended to share all property or just some subset. Id. This 
semi-contractual, semi-status approach has produced status-like outcomes. See, e.g., id. at 
64–65 (treating the relationship as marriage-like and dividing a pension); Longway-
Marotta v. Nelson, No. S-16367, 2017 WL 5505390, at *2–3 (Alaska Nov. 15, 2017). 
 161. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §§	6.03–.06 (AM. LAW INST. 2002). 
 162. §	6.03(7) (listing factors). 
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consent.”163 Critics have likewise charged that status approaches give 
too little weight to individual autonomy.164 
Because proponents of status approaches understand those 
approaches to be based on something other than consent, they have 
looked to alternative justificatory rationales that do not depend on 
the preferences of the parties. Alternatives include the creation of 
dependency, as when one’s conduct results in the birth of a vulnerable 
child165; the degree of subjective “closeness,” as implied by the ALI’s 
consideration of “emotional intimacy” and “qualitative[] 
distinct[iveness] from previous relationships”166; the promotion of 
equality between partners, especially to compensate benefits 
conferred during the course of the relationship167; or simply the 
treatment of like relationships—marriage and “almost-marriage”—
alike. 
These rationales suffer from over- and under-inclusiveness. That 
is because cohabiting relationships are not the only adult relationships 
that create dependency or are characterized by emotional closeness 
or sacrifice. Parents and their children, or siblings, for example, may 
pool resources, develop patterns of dependency, and be as 
emotionally connected as intimate partners.168 
The rationales are also unsatisfying. The dependency-creation 
rationale struggles to define dependency in absolute terms or to 
account for the agency of both partners. Imagine two associates at a 
major law firm earning approximately $200,000, one of whom leaves 
to take a job as a court staff attorney with a $100,000 salary because 
he wants to spend more time with his child and because he does not 
enjoy law firm life. Three years later, he and his partner break up. 
 
 163. BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 224 (noting that her proposal would impose 
obligations based on the length of the partners’ relationship “without their consent, similar 
to the proposal of the American Law Institute”).  
 164. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 856; see also Shahar 
Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal 
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1587–88 (2009); David Westfall, Forcing 
Incidents of Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The American Law Institute’s Principles 
of Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2001) (discussing the ALI 
Principles’ treatment of relationships as a “mandate” for unmarried cohabitants). 
 165. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 826–29. 
 166. See id. at 831–32; PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS §	6.03(7). 
 167. See BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 227 (describing ways in which a cohabitant can 
benefit the other partner by “contribut[ing] to household expenses, devot[ing] labor to 
[the] partner’s business, or simply tak[ing] care of the house and children); Garrison, Is 
Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 873–74 (correcting power imbalances). 
 168. See, e.g., Culhane, supra note 11, at 386–87 (describing a interdependent 
relationship between sisters who lived together for seventy-six years). 
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Assume he has been out-earned by over $400,000; has he been placed 
in a vulnerable or losing position owing to the relationship? On an 
absolute scale, $100,000 in annual income is generous; and nothing 
about his education or background suggests that his choices were 
constrained.169 Additionally, unlike the vertical relationship between 
parent and child, where the child has no meaningful choice in creating 
the vulnerable situation in which he finds himself, the horizontal 
relationship between adults must account for individual agency: the 
rationale does not explain the choices for which one’s partner should 
bear responsibility. 
The equalization rationale suffers from several deficiencies. Most 
importantly, it does not identify which relationships should be subject 
to redistribution but rather only what should happen when such 
relationships are already identified. Financial inequality alone does 
not create an obligation. For example, it does not explain why a 
wealthy roommate should not have to share his income with a less 
wealthy roommate, nor why a casual one-night stand with a wealthy 
person should not result in ongoing redistribution. Moreover, an 
insistence upon egalitarianism struggles to account for the myriad 
ways in which partners are differently situated—for example, in terms 
of their personal histories, values, and priorities—as well as the 
cumulative effects of their choices.170 And many relationships will 
have more liabilities than assets, resulting in the redistribution of 
(potentially unforeseen) obligations rather than support.171 
The functional rationale posits that relationships that are similar 
enough to marriages should be treated as marriages. The ALI 
Principles, for example, propose a set of rules presuming that adults 
without children who have cohabited for a sufficient length of time 
will be in relationships that “may be indistinguishable from marriage 
except for the legal formality of marriage.”172 But it is not clear what 
the hallmarks of marriage are: many marriages do not bear all the 
 
 169. As Marsha Garrison has argued, the partner might have benefited financially from 
the economies of scale and time created by sharing a residence. Garrison, Is Consent 
Necessary?, supra note 25, at 874–75. 
 170. See Schneider, supra note 148, at 1831. 
 171. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 573–74 
(4th ed. 2015) (noting that most families facing divorce have a low net worth, and a 
significant portion have only liabilities). 
 172. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 1, Overview of Chapter 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (footnote 
omitted). 
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hallmarks of marriage.173 The skein of rights and obligations 
associated with marriage cluster around separate, sometimes 
incoherent objectives,174 barely held together by marriage’s relatively 
coherent social and legal meaning.175 As a result, attempts to 
analogize “to marriage,” here and in the contract context, invite a 
comparison to an idealized, middle-class relationship.176 The task of 
analogizing runs a significant risk of improper fit, especially given the 
idiosyncrasies of nonmarital relationships and the class- and race-
based variations discussed in Section I.A. The consequences of this 
mismatch are the imposition of unwanted legal obligations or the 
denial of desired legal rights. 
 
*     *     * 
Existing approaches may sometimes extend rights and 
obligations to people in nonmarital relationships but only 
haphazardly. The failure to enact more consistent, coherent 
regulation stems from the absence of a justificatory rationale that 
 
 173. See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1765 (2005); 
Regan, supra note 25, at 1448 (noting that spouses may not share a common residence, 
sleep in the same bed, maintain joint bank accounts, or maintain sexual exclusivity). 
 174. Some scholars have observed the extent to which the state has pinned 
questionably related rights and obligations on marriage and have called for disaggregation 
of these rights. See infra notes 279–306 and accompanying text. 
 175. See Matsumura, supra note 10, at 2048–49; Scott & Scott, supra note 44, at 306–13. 
 176. The Reporters of the ALI Principles noted that “[d]omestic partners fail to marry 
for diverse reasons,” including that “some ethnic and social groups have a substantially 
lower incidence of marriage and a substantially higher incidence of informal domestic 
relationships than do others.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §	6.02 cmt. a. But their proposal does not take these 
differences into account. The choice of a one-size-fits-all solution disregards the reasons 
why people in certain demographic groups do not marry, see supra Section I.A.3. My 
suspicion is that the Reporters were more concerned about instances of “strong social or 
economic inequality between the partners, which allows the stronger partner to resist the 
weaker partner’s preference for marriage.” §	6.02 cmt. a. The roots of this concern can be 
found in Reporter Grace Ganz Blumberg’s important Article, supra note 29, in which 
Blumberg has focused on gender dynamics that disfavor women:  
Self-interest would lead the man to give up as little as possible. The woman has 
scant leverage with which to persuade him otherwise. She lacks economic power. 
She needs a stable relationship more than he does: it is vital to the comfortable 
exercise of her reproductive potential, and it is a means of enhancing her wealth 
and standard of living.	.	.	. Even a feminist must agree that there is ample economic 
and biological basis for Midge Decter’s assertion that “marriage is something 
asked by women and agreed to by men.” 
Id. at 1163. The solution proposed by the ALI Principles to impose marriage-like inter se 
obligations makes more sense in light of these concerns. Id. at 1163.  
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appropriately balances concerns about individual will, conduct, and 
consequences. Consent supplies that rationale. 
II.  WHY CONSENT? 
Consent is a concept capable of multiple interpretations. This 
Part defines consent and defends its relevance in the context of 
intimate regulation. 
A. Choice and Authorization 
Although they have not arrived at a consensus about an 
appropriate regulatory approach, courts, scholars, and policymakers 
generally agree that the law should recognize informal nonmarital 
relationships in some circumstances. Moreover, both the implied 
contract and implied status approaches agree that legal obligations 
can stem from conduct, rather than express commitments.177 And 
despite statements to the contrary,178 the status approach does not 
discount will entirely. In drafting the ALI Principles, for example, the 
Reporters gave significant weight to “what the parties themselves 
expected” and “emotional intimacy”179: subjective features. Status 
approaches also allow parties to contract out of the default status, 
preserving a space for the exercise of individual preferences.180 
There are many challenges with designing a legal rule around a 
person’s subjective will, including that those views are difficult to 
prove and subject to change.181 Nonetheless, it would be particularly 
inappropriate to discount the will of the parties in the context of 
choosing their relationships. The Supreme Court has recognized 
centrality of such exercises of will to one’s right of self-definition.182 
For example, the Court described the choice to marry as “inherent in 
the concept of individual autonomy[,]” and “among the most intimate 
that an individual can make.”183 So too, I have argued, is the decision 
 
 177. See supra Section I.B. 
 178. See supra text accompanying note 163. 
 179. Ellman, supra note 147, at 873, 883 (explaining the rationales underlying the 
regulation of long-term intimate relationships). 
 180. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §	6.01(2). Although Professor Bowman’s proposal would apply an 
irrebuttable presumption after two years of cohabitation, she too would allow parties to 
contract out of this status, indicating her sympathy to the importance of will/autonomy. 
BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 228.  
 181. See Matsumura, supra note 10, at 2052–53. 
 182. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1509, 1532–33 (2016) (discussing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)). 
 183. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
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not to marry.184 The choice to engage in private, consensual intimate 
conduct, even outside of marriage, is also one with which the state 
cannot interfere.185 
There is therefore broad agreement that will, conduct, and their 
relationship to consequences matter. A successful regulatory 
approach must balance those considerations. 
Consent is a tool for mediating the relationship between 
individual action and the legitimate exercise of state authority. 
Although consent has long been the subject of philosophical 
exploration and uncertainty,186 the law has consistently treated 
consent as a justification for the exercise of state power and as the 
basis for the creation or adjustment of legal relationships between 
individuals.187 
 
 184. See Matsumura, supra note 182, at 1541–42. 
 185. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 186. For centuries, political philosophers have struggled to identify the source of 
individual obligation to obey a jurisdiction’s laws, and the extent to which it stems from 
consent, whether actual or hypothetical. See Richard Dagger & David Lefkowitz, Political 
Obligation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 7, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries
/political-obligation/ [https://perma.cc/8B68-BXZK (dark archive)] (“[T]he history of 
political thought is replete with attempts to provide a satisfactory account of political 
obligation, from the time of Socrates to the present. These attempts have become 
increasingly sophisticated in recent years, but they have brought us no closer to 
agreement.”); see also DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT 
THEORY 1–4 (1989) (identifying questions raised by consent theory, including who needs 
to consent (and to what), how to consent, and when to consent). Social contractarians, 
including John Locke, have argued that individuals’ duty to submit to the State’s authority 
stems from individuals’ authority to bind themselves, and the exercise of that normative 
power in creating the State. See Fred D’Agostino, Gerald Gaus & John Thrasher, 
Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 31, 
2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/ [https://perma.cc
/32MA-LVM7 (dark archive)]. Critics of the social contract theory have challenged the 
accuracy of asserting that anyone ever granted consent. John Rawls has argued that 
though people cannot consent in advance to participate in society in a “literal sense,” 
“[o]ur social situation is just if it is such that by [a] sequence of hypothetical agreements 
we would have contracted into the general system of rules which defines it.” JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 13 (1971). Although this original position is purely 
hypothetical, it still reveals the principles, “moral or otherwise[,]	.	.	. that we do in fact 
accept.” Id. at 21. In response, some have argued that hypothetical consent, what one 
might have agreed to if asked in advance, has no force as consent and depends instead 
upon the reasons why it might be fair or proper to enforce rules nonetheless, rendering 
consent superfluous. See Ronald Dworkin, The Original Position, in READING RAWLS 16, 
18 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975).  
 187. See Schuck, supra note 34, at 901 (arguing that an “abiding, almost obsessive 
suspicion of state power” lives on in an “American political culture [that] still presumes 
that the most legitimate ground for binding individuals is their consent to the 
transaction”); cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) 
(proclaiming that governments “deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the 
governed”). 
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Consent is both “a decision in favor of a proposed course of 
action” and “a permission-giving act.”188 Consent therefore stems 
from individual will: the “ability to select a course of action as a 
means of fulfilling some desire.”189 But that decision itself raises 
complicated questions. For instance, the exercise of will is inevitably 
constrained by one’s circumstances. This raises the question whether 
consent requires unfettered choice or can exist when a person has a 
more limited range of options. Moreover, standards for identifying or 
proving the exercise of will can affect the extent to which the law 
protects it. For example, imagine a person who participates in a 
wedding ceremony and publicly says “I do,” yet harbors internal 
reservations about the decision to marry.190 The adoption of an 
objective standard of proof could hold her responsible for her public 
statements notwithstanding her hidden preferences to the contrary. 
The adoption of a subjective approach, in contrast, would credit her 
internal desires, although proving those desires would be 
complicated. The decisional component of consent therefore involves 
a conclusion about the nexus between will and conduct. 
The law may be satisfied by different manifestations of will 
depending on the circumstances.191 For example, within the context of 
consent to sexual relations, Heidi Hurd has argued that consent 
should focus entirely on a person’s subjective will.192 She argues that 
autonomy resides in the ability to will the alteration of moral rights 
and duties.193 If consent is normatively significant because it 
constitutes an expression of autonomy, then it must depend on the 
person’s state of mind at the relevant time.194 If the purpose of 
requiring the performance of a token act is merely to reflect the 
 
 188. Beauchamp, supra note 30, at 57. 
 189. Timothy O’Connor, Free Will, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 29, 2010), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ [https://perma.cc/NCM9-9JT6 (dark archive)]. 
 190. See Jackson K. v. Parisa G., 37 N.Y.S.3d 207, 2016 WL 1689184, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Apr. 8, 2016) (unpublished table opinion). 
 191. See Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT, supra note 30, at 251, 
255 (“[I]t serves neither autonomy nor welfare to demand the fullest form of consent 
before we treat the relevant moral or legal threshold as being met.”); Alan Wertheimer, 
Consent to Sexual Relations, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT, supra note 30, at 195, 196 (“The 
criteria for what constitutes [morally transformative] consent will always involve moral 
argument and empirical evidence that is sensitive to the reasons for adopting a more or 
less rigorous view of [morally transformative consent for the law].”); Beauchamp, supra 
note 30, at 58 (arguing that it could be “unreasonable to demand .	.	. [a]utonomy-
protective standards [that are] excessively difficult or impossible to implement”). 
 192. Heidi Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 124–25 (1996). 
 193. Id. at 124. 
 194. Id.; see also Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of Consent (II), 2 LEGAL 
THEORY 165, 165 (1996).  
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mental state, then the act itself is morally irrelevant.195 This proposed 
definition of consent emphasizes the importance of subjective will to 
the exclusion of objectively measurable authorization. Challenging 
this subjective approach, Alan Wertheimer has argued that if consent 
renders it permissible for A to do something to B, then B’s mental 
state alone—unaccompanied by any outward manifestation—would 
be incapable of authorizing A to act.196 He has therefore argued in 
favor of a “suitably qualified performative view” that “takes account 
of the background conditions within which [one] gives a token of 
consent.”197 Within the context of contract law, an objective approach 
has come to dominate the doctrinal analysis of contractual assent. To 
privilege subjective intent over objectively manifested behavior 
would, at best, promote uncertainty as to the terms of the agreement, 
and, at worst, incentivize contracting parties to generate evidence of 
contradictory intentions with which to undermine the validity of 
unfavorable agreements.198 Contract law has therefore largely treated 
the relevant acts of will as objective ones.199 
Consent is also an authorization: it justifies the imposition of 
legal obligations.200 Although discussions of consent tend to collapse 
the will and authorization inquiries, an expression—e.g., a statement 
of terms followed by “I agree”—or an act—e.g., accepting a shipment 
of goods—might prove one but not the other. For example, most of us 
regularly click through online form agreements, indicating that we 
 
 195. See Hurd, supra note 192, at 137. 
 196. See Alan Wertheimer, What Is Consent? And Is It Important?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 557, 568 (2000).  
 197. Id. at 571.  
 198. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 647, 651 (2012); Barnett, supra note 35, at 635. 
 199. See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 521 (Va. 1954) (“In the field of contracts, 
as generally elsewhere, ‘[w]e must look to the outward expression of a person as 
manifesting his intention rather than to his secret and unexpressed intention. The law 
imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words 
and acts.’” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke Oil Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770 
(Va. 1937))); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 
303 (1986) (arguing that “whether one has consented to a transfer of rights .	.	. generally 
depends not on one’s subjective opinion about the meaning of one’s freely chosen words 
or conduct, but on the ordinary meaning that is attached to them”); Wertheimer, supra 
note 196, at 567–68 (“As a general proposition, no one thinks that the consent that gives 
rise to a binding promise refers to anyone’s mental state. To promise is to promise, not to 
have the intent or desire to promise.”). 
 200. The concept of consent also plays a role in determining the moral duties owed by 
private individuals—i.e., how we should treat one another. But my focus is on the role 
consent plays in the creation of a legal relationship—i.e., one that the state will enforce 
through its coercive power. 
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have read and agree to terms and conditions that we have not seen.201 
The act of checking boxes arguably offers express proof of 
authorization202 but not necessarily of will.203 Here, lack of knowledge 
of terms and conditions would prevent a decision in their favor. 
Similarly, physicians’ common practice of obtaining informed 
consent—disclosing risks, proposing a course of action, and obtaining 
a signed consent form—provides evidence of something, although 
scholars are skeptical about whether patients can truly understand the 
consequences of the procedure they are authorizing.204 
As an authorization, consent has been treated as critical to the 
creation of particularized legal duties running between contracting 
parties.205 It builds, from the ground up, specific legal obligations that 
otherwise would not exist. Although tort operates in the opposite 
direction, imposing liability for “conduct the law treats as wrong,”206 a 
tort plaintiff’s consent to the defendant’s conduct “marks a deficiency 
in [a] prima facie case at the most fundamental level: where the 
plaintiff consents, the defendant’s act is simply not tortious.”207 
Admittedly, the law places limits on consent by balancing it with 
other values. In the tort context, for example, courts have limited 
defenses like assumption of the risk and product warnings and have 
imposed heightened informed consent requirements governing 
health-care-related injuries.208 And in the contract realm, doctrines 
like substantive unconscionability209 and public policy,210 as well as the 
 
 201. See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 37, at 126–28.  
 202. See Barnett, supra note 35, at 635 (analogizing clicking a box on an online click 
license agreement to agreeing to perform whatever a trusted friend specifies in a sealed 
letter, the contents of which are unknown).  
 203. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 37, at 124–26 (noting that most consumers are not 
actually aware of terms, leading courts to ask whether the consumers had reasonable 
notice of the existence of the terms).  
 204. See, e.g., Beauchamp, supra note 30, at 58 (questioning patients’ substantive 
understanding of the procedures to which they purportedly consent).  
 205. See Radin, supra note 37, at 508 (“A core contract, in the sense of traditional 
theories, (i) shifts particular entitlements between two private parties, in a context of 
exchange between them, where (ii) the parties to the exchange are human beings who 
possess free will or autonomy, .	.	. and where (iii) each party arrives at and commits to a 
particular specific exchange, a consensus ad idem, through exercise of the party’s own free 
will or autonomy.” (footnote omitted)).  
 206. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 
§	12 (2d ed., West 2011 & Supp. 2017). 
 207. Id. §	105 (noting that “[t]he consent principle is general in its scope, firm in its 
acceptance, and central in its significance”); see also Schuck, supra note 34, at 902 
(observing that consent by the victim relieves the injurer of the duty she owes and also 
makes her conduct non-faulty). 
 208. See Schuck, supra note 34, at 907–08. 
 209. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §	208 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
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expanded use of custom, trade usage, and changed circumstances, 
place limits on what parties can consent to and how strictly those 
terms are to be interpreted.211 These rules effectively make it more 
difficult for individuals to authorize the wrongful conduct of another 
or to create enforceable duties. But they have not erased the 
fundamental importance of consent to the legal relations imposed 
upon private individuals. 
These inquiries reveal that consent is not a rigid concept capable 
of universal application. Rather, it is a conclusion that a particular 
exercise of will justifies the imposition of legal consequences when 
balanced against other considerations. To say that consent is required 
is therefore to raise the question of the appropriateness of the state’s 
exercise of authority under the circumstances. 
B. Addressing Consent Skepticism 
Thus far, I have argued that from a legal perspective, consent is a 
conclusion about the relationship between the individual and the 
state. Unless one takes the position that individual will imposes no 
limits on the exercise of state authority, consent is inescapable. 
However, many scholars have expressed skepticism that consent is 
relevant to the imposition of legal obligations on people in intimate 
relationships. Their arguments provide a useful tool to sharpen the 
concepts discussed in the previous Section. 
First, critics of consent argue that because it is impossible for 
people to contemplate, much less will, all the ways the law will affect 
marriage or marriage-like relationships, consent is not worth pursuing 
as an explanatory rationale. This argument implicitly defines consent 
as synonymous with will and insists on a glovelike fit between will and 
particularized obligations: that people can only will that which they 
directly contemplate. Further, they contend that the definition of 
consent cannot allow a looser fit between will and obligation because 
such an expanded definition would render the concept of consent 
meaningless. Such a watered-down definition would require “little 
more than a willingness to be part of a society that recognizes 
obligations toward others.”212 Second, the law has frequently imposed 
duties between adults and children over a party’s (usually a man’s) 
objections. For example, the law has forced statutory rape victims to 
pay child support for their biological children, imposed obligations on 
 
 210. See id. §	178.  
 211. See Linzer, supra note 33, at 142. 
 212. Id. 
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fathers who were affirmatively deceived by their partners, and even 
imposed obligations on men whose sperm was misappropriated. If 
consent is irrelevant to the imposition of obligations in the vertical 
parent-child relationship, why should it be necessary in a horizontal 
relationship between adults? And third, critics of consent are 
suspicious of neoliberal commitments to existing property 
entitlements and argue that consent inherently preserves 
distributional inequalities. I address these arguments in turn. 
The first argument evokes and then critiques a definition of 
consent that virtually equates consent with subjective will. Nancy 
Polikoff, for example, argues that consent rests on a “fatal flaw”: “the 
premise that those who marry or do not marry accurately understand 
the legally enforceable economic obligations that each will have 
towards the other.”213 Relatedly, Ira Ellman has cautioned against 
“inferring understandings very freely from the parties’ conduct.”214 
These arguments insist that the parties manifest a subjective 
understanding about the specific legal consequences that would flow 
from their actions in order to consent to those consequences. Where 
the parties were not even aware of, much less willed, those 
consequences, consent has no explanatory role.215 
Implicit in the strictness of this definition is skepticism about the 
consequences of stretching consent too far. The skeptics have a point. 
For example, within the political theory context, John Locke argued 
that “every man, that hath any possession, or enjoyment, of any part 
of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit 
consent, . . . whether this his possession be of land, . . . or whether it be 
barely travelling freely on the highway.”216 The notion that by 
traveling on the highway one consents to obey this country’s system 
of laws may seem absurd because of the attenuated relationship 
between the act and the thing it is supposed to justify.217 The 
challenge faced by Locke is the challenge faced by consent generally. 
 
 213. Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic Partner 
Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 370. 
 214. Ellman, supra note 147, at 874; see also id. at 874–75 (“It is arguably likely that 
even couples with very clear understandings about their conduct during marriage never 
had any common understanding about the consequences of dissolution.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 215. Polikoff, supra note 213, at 372. 
 216. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 113, 176 (Mark Goldie ed., 1993) (1698) (emphasis added). 
 217. See HERZOG, supra note 186, at 184 (“If tacit consent reaches as far as the brute 
fact of residence, regardless of one’s alternatives, regardless of one’s reasons for remaining 
.	.	. it reaches too far.”). 
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Consent theorists . . . need a conception of consent that is 
descriptively plausible: they need to be able to point at citizens 
and show us their consent. But that conception also needs to be 
normatively robust: whatever counts as consent has to generate 
an obligation. These two requirements pull in different 
directions.218 
The looser the fit between act and obligation, the less the act looks 
like consent. 
That said, as I argued in the previous Section, there is no single 
definition of consent.219 Rather, a definition should consider “what is 
fair and reasonable to require in circumstances of practice.”220 One 
might not see consent as especially important in situations that are 
morally straightforward; for example, when imposing a generalized 
duty not to harm a passersby unnecessarily.221 But in a morally 
complicated area like consent to sexual relations, the law might insist 
on a greater fit between the parties’ will and the permission-giving 
act.222 The same distinction could be made between duties owed to all 
versus special duties owed to one, or a few: the law might reasonably 
require a tighter fit between will, act, and consequence in the latter 
context. 
In few other contexts has the law required as strict a definition as 
the one consent critics advocate. As I will argue at length in the next 
Section, contract doctrine balances the parties’ preferences against 
the fact that it would be impossible to contemplate, much less 
memorialize, all of their views about the different legal and factual 
permutations within a single agreement.223 At bottom, arguments 
about the definition of consent are not arguments against the 
functions that consent performs. I doubt that critics of consent would 
authorize the state to make a person responsible for an adult or child 
to whom the person has little apparent connection, like a stranger 
living on the other side of town. 
 
 218. Id. at 185. 
 219. See supra note 191. 
 220. Beauchamp, supra note 30, at 58. 
 221. See Cynthia A. Stark, Hypothetical Consent and Justification, 97 J. PHIL. 313, 318 
(2000) (noting that critiques of hypothetical consent “are not concerned with the problem 
of the bindingness of moral rules generally, but rather with the bindingness of those 
principles to which one might think consent is especially relevant”). 
 222. The importance of these interests is why the topic of consent to sexual relations 
has remained controversial, as the recent college affirmative-consent policies attest. See, 
e.g., Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 889 
(2016). 
 223. See infra Section III.A. 
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The second argument is that the law imposes family obligations 
without consent all the time. If consent is not required to impose 
obligations in one type of family relationship (between parents and 
children), then it should not be required to impose obligations in 
another type of family relationship (between adults). Parental 
obligations have traditionally flowed from consanguinity or status.224 
These obligations have been imposed in cases where the facts suggest 
that men did not intend to have a child, but the law imposed 
fatherhood nonetheless, for example where a man’s partner promised 
not to hold him responsible for the child225; misrepresented her 
fertility226; engaged in sex with a minor not capable of offering legal 
consent227; or appropriated his sperm and inseminated herself.228 
Once one rejects the view that consent and will are synonymous, 
however, it is not clear that consent plays no role in the imposition of 
duties between parent and child. The unwanted fatherhood cases 
involve voluntary acts from which parenthood might predictably flow. 
In State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer,229 for example, a minor father 
who was only thirteen years old at the time of conception argued that 
he was not legally capable of consenting to sexual intercourse and 
therefore could not have consented to the birth of his child.230 But 
when analyzing voluntariness, the court noted that “the sexual 
relationship . . . lasted over a period of several months. At no time did 
Shane register any complaint to his parents about the sexual liaison.”231 
The court later concluded that the infant, “the only truly innocent 
party, is entitled to support from both her parents regardless of their 
 
 224. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 826; Michael J. Higdon, 
Marginalized Fathers and Demonized Mothers: A Feminist Look at the Reproductive 
Freedom of Unmarried Men, 66 ALA. L. REV. 507, 517 (2015); Emily J. Stolzenberg, The 
New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 22–23) (on file 
with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 225. See, e.g., Kesler v. Weniger, 744 A.2d 794, 795 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (rejecting a 
man’s contention that he only agreed to father a child because the child’s mother promised 
that he would not be held responsible for the child’s financial support). 
 226. See, e.g., Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 2007) (involving the 
imposition of child support upon a man who had sex with the child’s mother after she 
assured him that she was both infertile and using birth control). 
 227. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1274 (Kan. 1993) 
(imposing child support obligations on a minor who was thirteen years old when he had 
sex and conceived a child with his babysitter who was seventeen years old at the time). 
 228. See, e.g., Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579, at *1–3 (Ill. Ct. App. 
Feb. 22, 2005) (involving a woman’s unconsented use of sperm collected in a condom after 
oral sex in order to conceive). 
 229. 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993). 
 230. Id. at 1275. 
 231. Id. at 1277 (emphasis added). 
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ages.”232 These statements indicate that the court viewed the 
imposition of parenthood as a reasonable consequence of the father’s 
voluntary actions.233 Especially in light of the strong policies favoring 
the support of “innocent” children, one can interpret this result as 
adopting an objective approach within a consent framework. 
Even if the imposition of vertical duties rejects consent, the 
departure is typically justified by dependency creation: the adults 
involved have caused the child’s dependency and therefore owe the 
child duties of support.234 This rationale applies with much less force 
in the horizontal context. It is easier to argue that children have no 
role in the creation of dependency because they exercise no agency in 
their birth nor in the circumstances in which they find themselves. In 
contrast, even granting that adults operate within circumstances of 
constraint, it is difficult to argue that a competent adult had a 
comparably reduced level of agency in the nonmarital relationship.235 
The third argument against consent is that it instantiates 
neoliberal assumptions about property relations that are antithetical 
to the family. Neoliberalism describes an ideology that promotes the 
expansion of market logic—specifically, an individualistic, 
 
 232. Id. at 1279 (emphasis added). 
 233. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 
255, 293–300 (2011). There are, admittedly, a few instances in which the law has imposed 
parental obligations on men who did not voluntarily participate in a child’s creation. See 
Stolzenberg, supra note 224, at 24–26 (collecting cases). In these situations, as well as those 
in which obligations are imposed over a person’s express non-consent, it is perhaps futile 
to justify the obligation on this basis. This Article focuses on the obligations between 
adults and the state, so the question whether the law should revisit vertical obligations is 
beyond the scope of this Article, although others have contested this issue. 
 234. Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 828. Martha Fineman has 
argued that the inevitable dependency created by the mother-child relationship is so 
important that it should displace the marital relationship as the central family relationship 
recognized by the state. See FINEMAN, supra note 114, at 228. With the state playing a 
supportive, nurturing role, the focus would not be on consent, but rather on the 
caretaker/dependent relationship. See id. at 233–35. But she distinguishes purely adult 
relationships, in which “the interactions of female and male sexual affiliates would be 
governed by the same rules that regulate other interactions in our society—specifically 
those of contract and property.” Id. at 229.  
 235. When women were prevented from exercising full control over property and were 
discouraged from participating in the economic sphere, the comparison to children may 
have been more appropriate. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 828–
29 (explaining the burdens of coverture historically justified support obligations). 
Although women have not yet achieved economic equality, the analogy to children seems 
extreme when considering modern marital relationships. See id. at 874–77 (noting the 
absence of persuasive evidence that women are systematically exploited in cohabiting 
relationships); Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21, at 109 (explaining that the two traditional 
restrictions on women which resulted in dependency on men, including labor restrictions 
and lack of contraception, are no longer prevalent in society).  
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unencumbered, wealth-maximizing ethos—to all social and legal 
realms.236 Anne Alstott has argued that “[i]n family law, three 
neoliberal ideals dominate both constitutional and subconstitutional 
law: negative liberty, market distribution, and the minimal state.”237 
Although consent typically has an unobjectionable moral valence—
for instance, few argue that we should promote nonconsensual sexual 
relations—its legal significance is often associated with the concept of 
unfettered economic exchange.238 
The association of consent and market logic has led to several 
distinct concerns. Scholars have argued that to the extent that the law 
equates autonomy with one’s choice of financial obligations, it 
reinforces the notion that people are individual economic units.239 
This individualistic approach is incompatible with the 
interdependency that develops within familial relationships and 
therefore fails to credit the joint contributions and the (sometimes 
contrary) expectations of both partners.240 Approaching adult 
relationships through the lens of economic exchange may destabilize 
“intimate relationships’ cooperative, collaborative qualities.”241 
Moreover, requiring consent may hinder the necessary redistribution 
of resources or legitimize distributional inequalities. To the extent 
they fail to question the allocation of entitlements in the first instance, 
consent theory risks cementing them.242 For example, before we 
determine whether an employer has bargained away with his 
employee the right to fire that employee at will, we have to determine 
whether he has that right in the first place; if he is motivated by race 
or sex, the law might deprive him of such a right.243 In the domestic 
context, consent can obscure the fact that decisions are not always 
made on an even playing field. If one partner earns somewhat less 
 
 236. See Melissa Murray & Karen Tani, Something Old, Something New: Reflections on 
the Sex Bureaucracy, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 122, 152–53 (2016). 
 237. Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-
Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 26–27 (2014). 
 238. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 199, at 297 (describing contract law as the libertarian 
exchange of already vested entitlements). 
 239. Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1136–37; Stolzenberg, supra note 224, at 51. 
 240. Stolzenberg, supra note 224, at 52–56.  
 241. Id. at 57–58.  
 242. See Braucher, supra note 36, at 712–13 (“Interrelated elements of wealth, power, 
knowledge, and judgment of the parties constitute the conditions in which they make 
choices or undertake relationships. Choices, relationships, entitlements, and abilities 
cannot be separated.”); Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 21–22 (1989) (noting that “the prior assignment of rights and obligations” affects 
consent). 
 243. Peter Linzer, Is Consent the Essence of Contract?—Replying to Four Critics, 1988 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 213, 220 n.11. 
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and provides more care of a dependent child, for example, seemingly 
equal contributions to household expenses will result in the higher 
earning partner having more income to keep for himself.244 
These concerns rightfully arise the more the law favors a 
subjective definition of consent. If one’s consent were only valid if 
one subjectively willed the precise obligation at hand, redistribution 
would be rare indeed. But that consent can accompany the 
perpetuation of a market ideology in the family realm does not 
suggest that it must. Consent is not inconsistent with the recognition 
of positive rights nor does it require a minimal state; it simply ensures, 
in light of the existing state of affairs, that the state justify its exercise 
of authority.245 A definition of consent that insists upon a tight fit 
between subjective will and the objective conduct triggering legal 
obligations, coupled with heightened proof requirements and a rigid 
understanding of property concepts like title and vested rights, will 
produce neoliberal outcomes. But a different consent framework 
could produce different outcomes. 
Finally, consent does not shield underlying entitlements from 
searching analysis. The law makes determinations about the 
alienability of objects and actions, thereby altering their status as 
property.246 For example, some workers cannot sell more than forty 
hours of their labor per week without requiring a higher overtime 
wage. The law should calibrate these rules to respond to the sources 
of inequality rather than attempting piecemeal remediation on the 
backs of individuals who happen to be in intimate relationships. If 
gender disparities in salaries or educational opportunities place 
women in a disadvantageous position compared to their male 
partners, the law should address those inequalities directly rather 
than through the happenstance of the person with whom any given 
woman is cohabiting.247 
The concerns I respond to in this Section sharpen several aspects 
of consent that are useful going forward. They reveal that consent is 
context-dependent and can vary in terms of the extent to which it 
emphasizes the importance of will and authorization. Consent does 
 
 244. BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 170.  
 245. See Brilmayer, supra note 242, at 23 (arguing that “[c]onsent is a process value, 
not a justification of a particular state of affairs”). 
 246. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1849 (1987) (exploring the significance of market-inalienability and its justifications). 
 247. If gender-based earning disparities were to justify redistribution, they would have 
no effect in a relationship with a lower earning man or another woman. In those 
relationships, as in situations involving single women, the law would fail to address the 
problem of wage discrimination. 
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not justify existing entitlements but instead governs the way that the 
state alters them. Above all, consent highlights the relationship 
between individual freedom and state regulation. 
III.  CONSENT TO INTIMATE REGULATION 
This Part articulates two methodological refinements for 
determining whether parties have consented to the imposition of 
intimate obligations. The first focuses on identifying the act of 
consent. The second focuses on how to define the object of consent. 
A. Determining the Act of Consent 
I have shown that consent is an analytic framework that insists 
upon different relationships between will and authorization 
depending on the context. The challenge in any given context is to 
articulate a definition of consent that appropriately balances will, 
conduct, and the policy considerations that justify the exercise of state 
power. This is the very inquiry that has both evaded and confounded 
regulatory efforts to this point. As revealed in Section I.B., courts and 
scholars have battled about a caricature of consent without 
considering what consent to the imposition of legal obligations 
between partners and the state should actually look like.248 
A key challenge to the imposition of obligations on people in 
nonmarital relationships is the diversity of relationship structures and 
the complicated relationship between those diverse forms and the 
partners’ subjective views. As a law of voluntary obligations arising 
within idiosyncratic relationships, contract law has clear parallels to 
nonmarital relationships. Although I have previously argued for 
greater enforcement of contracts between nonmarital partners,249 that 
is not my argument here. Rather, I contend here that when looking 
for principles that explain the relationship between will, conduct, and 
corresponding obligations, contract doctrine may be a useful guide. 
The concept of consent is at the core of classical contract 
doctrine. Contract law creates a legal relationship between parties 
based on the terms to which they have assented: that legal 
relationship would not exist absent the parties’ consent.250 
 
 248. See Joo, supra note 26, at 162 (noting that in the realm of intimate relationships, 
courts and scholars have imported a “market-libertarian normative view about the role of 
bargaining”). 
 249. See Matsumura, supra note 21, at 215. 
 250. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §	17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of 
mutual assent.”); Bix, supra note 191, at 251 (noting the common view that consent is “at 
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Assumptions about consent explain why most people would find it 
shocking if the act of walking down a street and glancing in a store 
window would create a legal obligation to purchase a product 
displayed there at the listed price. Depending on how one defines it, 
however, consent is missing in virtually all contracting situations. 
Contracts are always incomplete, making it impossible to 
attribute all the legal consequences that may be imposed to the 
parties’ will. In the first place, “[b]ecause parties cannot predict 
uncertain future events or states of the world, ex ante, they lack 
information needed for complete contracts . . . . Consequently, parties 
cannot realistically achieve complete contracts, and many contracts 
remain inefficiently incomplete.”251 For example, the inclusion of the 
term “US Fresh Frozen Chicken, Grade A . . . 2 ½–3 lbs” in a contract 
between a buyer and seller of poultry may seem sufficiently clear until 
a dispute arises as to whether the term “chicken” means only young 
birds or older “stewing chicken” meeting the size and quality 
requirements.252 It is not always clear what meanings lie beneath the 
surface of even the simplest of terms; further specification (chickens 
of a certain breed or color) is always possible but would make 
agreements impossibly long and unwieldy. 
Moreover, as Professor Richard Craswell has demonstrated, 
parties are bound by background rules—“those parts of contract law 
 
the essence of contract law”); Kostritsky, supra note 36, at 331 (“The justification for 
contract law rests on the assent of the parties.”); Schuck, supra note 34, at 900 (“Consent is 
the master concept that defines the law of contracts in the United States.”). This is not to 
say that consent is the sole justification for enforcing agreements. Numerous scholars have 
observed that the law will sometimes impose non-consensual obligations based on a 
party’s conduct or social policy. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 36, at 701 (noting that legal 
decision-makers have the authority to assess the validity of consent, “mold obligations 
along socially desired lines,” and “supply a great deal of the content of contractual 
obligation,” undermining the position of consent as an individual-based obligation); Orit 
Gan, The Many Faces of Contractual Consent, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 615, 617 (2017) (arguing 
that the law should recognize “shades” of consent); Linzer, supra note 33, at 142 
(“[C]onsent is far from indispensable today, and .	.	. is increasingly being seen as only one 
of a number of factors affecting contract-like liability.”). Courts will also refuse to enforce 
agreements to which the parties consented based on their own “policy evaluation about 
the substance of the agreement.” Joo, supra note 26, at 181; see also Nancy S. Kim, 
Relative Consent and Contract Law, 18 NEV. L.J. 165, 176–78 (2017) (arguing that consent 
may be withdrawn or “destroyed” under certain conditions). I neither advance nor defend 
the view that contract is solely based on consent. Rather, I argue that consent is typically 
viewed as a central guiding concept, an argument with which even those critical of consent 
seem to agree. See Linzer, supra note 33, at 142 (“This is not to say that consent is 
irrelevant.”). 
 251. Kostritsky, supra note 36, at 335. 
 252. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
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that govern the proper remedies for breach, the conditions under 
which the promisor is excused from her duty to perform, or the 
additional obligations (such as implied warranties) imputed to the 
promisor as an implicit part of her promise”—that will impact the 
parties’ rights but over which they may have little control.253 Parties 
may have no knowledge of these terms or may not have selected them 
if given the opportunity. These problems arise even in the context of 
arms-length negotiations between sophisticated parties represented 
by legal counsel. But there is a whole category of exchanges currently 
subsumed under the rubric of contract law that do not involve 
negotiations in the traditional sense. These transactions are governed 
by boilerplate terms—“composite rigid texts, most often consisting of 
fine print, delivered to consumers, employees, and many businesses in 
the position of consumers”254—that parties agree to by clicking “I 
accept” on a webpage or even by browsing a website.255 
One response to the parties’ inability to will the entirety of their 
agreements is to reject the value of consent as an explanatory 
concept, as some family law scholars have done.256 But among 
contract scholars, even skeptics of consent are not willing to go that 
far. For example, although Jean Braucher argues that consent 
overemphasizes contract’s private functions and does not credit the 
extent to which contract is regulatory, she only goes so far as to argue 
that “[c]onsent will not work as a rationale to enforce contracts 
without also bringing in social control of the parties’ affairs.”257 
Margaret Radin, one of the staunchest critics of form agreements, 
argues that those “agreements” should be removed from the rubric of 
contract and subjected to regulation under legal theories like tort law 
rather than arguing against the centrality of consent to contract.258 
It would be an overstatement to suggest that the role of consent 
in contract is settled as a theoretical matter. But contract doctrine has 
developed useful tools to deal with the practical problem of 
incomplete agreements within diverse relationships. The first is that 
the law has defined the doctrine of mutual assent or consensus ad 
idem loosely: “both parties must understand and freely consent to one 
and the same exchange, without necessarily assuming that each party 
 
 253. See Craswell, supra note 35, at 489–90; see also Bix, supra note 191, at 251; 
Braucher, supra note 36, at 730. 
 254. Radin, supra note 37, at 515–16.  
 255. See id. at 519–20.  
 256. See supra Section II.B.  
 257. Braucher, supra note 36, at 700 (emphasis added). 
 258. See Radin, supra note 37, at 531–33.  
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must explicitly consent to each and every clause.”259 A key insight 
from contract law is that the parties’ relationship may be governed in 
part by terms that are the product of hypothetical bargains, terms to 
which they did not in fact agree,260 but only if the parameters of the 
agreement are sufficiently certain.261 Otherwise, a court would go too 
far in “imposing its own conception of what the parties should or 
might have undertaken, rather than confining itself to the 
implementation of a bargain to which [the parties] have mutually 
committed themselves.”262 Under black letter law, terms are certain 
when “they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach 
and for giving an appropriate remedy.”263 
This certainty requirement as to the key terms authorizes legal 
intervention within a realm circumscribed by the parties’ preferences. 
Courts tend to analyze certainty in several different ways. They can 
look to whether the agreement specifies the key terms.264 Terms that 
define a product or performance, allocate responsibilities between the 
parties, or specify a date for performance may be deemed essential.265 
Relatedly, courts ask whether the existing terms of the agreement 
provide a basis for determining whether a breach has occurred and, if 
so, what the remedy will be.266 The focus of this inquiry is whether, in 
light of the broader goals of the parties, the parties have sufficiently 
manifested their intentions so that a court would have certainty about 
the parameters of those goals. Courts also analyze certainty by 
looking to see whether the parties have left open terms for future 
 
 259. See id. at 508 n.2; see also Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving 
Contracts (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) 
(“Mutual assent has never required a complete understanding of – and assent to – every 
specific term in a contract by every party to a contract.”).  
 260. See Bix, supra note 191, at 261; Joo, supra note 26, at 163. 
 261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §	33 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 262. Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (N.Y. 
1981). 
 263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §	33(2). 
 264. See §	33 cmt. a (“If the essential terms are so uncertain that there is no basis for 
deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there is no contract.”); §	33 cmt. 
f (“The more important the uncertainty, the stronger the indication is that the parties do 
not intend to be bound.”).  
 265. See, e.g., Acad. Chi. Publishers v. Cheever, 578 N.E.2d 981, 984 (Ill. 1991) 
(concluding that a publication agreement for an anthology of short stories that did not 
describe the length and content of the proposed book, did not identify who would decide 
whether stories would be included, and did not specify a date for delivery of the 
manuscript, was missing key terms). 
 266. See id. (“Without setting forth adequate terms for compliance, the publishing 
agreement provides no basis for determining when breach has occurred.”). 
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agreement.267 Agreements to agree are classic examples of indefinite 
agreements: language indicating the necessity of future negotiations 
or contemplating the existence of future agreements are not 
enforceable.268 Once a court is convinced that the key terms are 
sufficiently certain, the court may infer missing terms based on past 
dealings, custom, or other objective methods of determination.269 
The second doctrinal innovation is the acceptance of an objective 
theory of assent. The implementation of the objective theory provides 
a useful guide for balancing the need to honor subjective preferences 
with the function of objective authorization. Courts will look to the 
objectively manifested actions of the parties, rather than their internal 
preferences, to determine to what commitments the parties 
assented.270 But contract law has not moved to complete objectivity: it 
still protects individual will by ensuring that contracting parties have a 
minimal level of mental capacity (i.e., making agreements by the 
insane voidable271); that a party’s beliefs regarding a basic assumption 
on which the contract is made are in accord with the facts272; and that 
the commitment is not the product of undue influence or duress.273 It 
also honors the shared subjective intent of the parties regarding the 
meaning of a contract term even if it departs from the objective 
meaning.274 These limits on the objective view of consent ensure a 
 
 267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §	33 cmt. c (“The more terms the 
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REV. 427, 464 (2000). 
 272. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§	151–54. 
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suitable relationship between will and conduct, while recognizing 
that, in some situations, the two will diverge. 
These tools provide a convenient jumping-off point to examine 
the ideal relationship between individual will and legal authorization 
within the context of informal relationships. Like contract, intimate 
relationships involve two or more individuals with distinct autonomy 
interests.275 Because many goals of a relationship cannot be achieved 
unilaterally, the relevant act of will must enlist the other. To 
accomplish this, just as in contract law, the act of will must be 
objectively manifested. 
Moreover, given the innumerable interactions that characterize 
intimate relationships, many of which could be understood to involve 
some sort of exchange or the performance of obligations based on ill-
defined standards, the law cannot require that every possible 
contingency be the product of a fully informed decision before 
authorizing legal intervention. Like contract law, authorization should 
flow from objectively manifested consent to key commitments. To the 
extent that subsidiary legal consequences flow from those 
commitments, hypothetical authorization is sufficient. As in the 
contract context, courts should be sensitive to the possibility that the 
partners might consent to separate and severable commitments. 
Within the context of adult intimate relationships, consent, in short, 
should be objective acts sufficient to authorize or waive an objection 
to the imposition of particular rights or obligations that relate to those 
acts. 
This approach elevates the partners’ conduct over their privately 
held intentions. It therefore invites the possibility that a partner could 
“trap” himself by doing or saying something that would lead to the 
imposition of obligations against his will. These risks are justified in 
part by the need to protect the reliance interests of the partners.276 
For example, if one partner says something that would reasonably 
induce the other partner to take action detrimental to his self-
interest—e.g., “Why don’t you just take that lower paying job so that 
we have more time to go on vacation; I can cover the rent”—the 
state’s interest in protecting reliance interests might necessitate 
disregarding the subjective will of the one making the statement. But, 
as in the contract context, doctrines such as duress or mutual mistake 
 
 275. See Matsumura, supra note 10, at 2026. 
 276. Cf. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936) (explaining the concept of “reliance interest” in 
terms of a contractual relationship). 
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provide additional assurance that the conduct was the product of 
will.277 They ensure that will does not stray too far from conduct. 
B. Determining the Scope of Obligation 
The preceding discussion established that consent justifies the 
imposition of obligations when a person objectively manifests the will 
to be bound to the key terms of a commitment or obligation. To 
argue that the law should impose obligations only after a person 
objectively consents to the key aspects of those obligations begs the 
question of how to identify the terms to which the parties have 
consented. I propose a different way of looking at the objects of 
consent in the nonmarital context. The aggregation of benefits in a 
single status has thwarted attempts to measure “fit” between conduct 
and functional categories. Rather than asking whether the partners 
have willed a marriage-like relationship, we should disaggregate the 
package of rights and obligations bound up in the status of marriage 
to determine the parties’ commitments. This argument gathers 
strength from two premises. First, marriage performs a variety of 
functions, not all of which necessarily rise and fall together. Second, 
elsewhere in the law, identical parties often engage in separate 
transactions, which have separate aims and require separate consents, 
and tools exist to determine whether they should rise and fall 
together. 
The rights and obligations of marriage are ripe for 
disaggregation. Recall the reasons the law might seek to impose legal 
obligations on people in informal relationships. One party might ask a 
court to recognize the partner’s inter se obligations: his respective 
claims to property or support from the other.278 Or he may seek some 
benefit typically reserved for married people, like the right to visit his 
partner in the hospital or to make medical decisions on his behalf. Or, 
the state may seek to hold him responsible when his partner applies 
for disability coverage or treat the partners the same as they would a 
married couple for the purpose of calculating their income tax. 
Marriage groups these rights and obligations in a single package. 
All of these commitments are accessed by one act, the choice to 
 
 277. These doctrines could be strengthened to provide greater protection if need be. 
For example, a doctrine akin to procedural or substantive unconscionability could raise 
the baseline for the commitments that would be reasonable for a person to make or the 
conditions under which the commitments were made. 
 278. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
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marry.279 Although the default rule is that spouses share the income 
and property they accumulate during the marriage, they can alter 
most of their inter se obligations by agreement.280 But most of the 
spouses’ rights as against third parties or the state are beyond their 
power to contract: spouses cannot elect to file income tax returns as 
single281; they cannot avoid liabilities incurred by the other spouse for 
the benefit of the marriage.282 As the Supreme Court observed in 
Obergefell v. Hodges,283 marriage is “the basis for an expanding list of 
governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities.”284 
No one believes that spouses understand on a granular level the 
full package of rights and obligations that accompany marriage when 
they marry.285 Yet the formal choice to marry has historically justified 
the imposition of those rights and obligations.286 Although divorcing 
 
 279. See Matsumura, supra note 10, at 2033–35. Professor Gregg Strauss has 
demonstrated that social norms around marriage serve other functions beyond providing 
notice, namely that they enforce open-ended or “imperfect” duties during ongoing 
relationships. See Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: A Partial 
Defense of Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1310 (2015). 
 280. See, e.g., Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital 
and Marital Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 318–19 (2012) (noting that all American 
jurisdictions will enforce premarital agreements concerning economic consequences but 
that procedural and substantive requirements may differ); Sean Hannon Williams, 
Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 832–38 (describing the legal treatment of 
agreements between spouses). But see Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern 
Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 85 (1994) (noting the substantial limitations on 
disinheriting spouses). 
 281. See 26 U.S.C. §	7703 (2012); Argyle v. Comm’r Internal Revenue, 397 F. App’x 
823, 824 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a married person who is neither divorced nor under a 
decree of separate maintenance is not entitled to single-filing status).  
 282. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §	910 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2018 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 283. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 284. Id. at 2601. A quick glance at the Court’s list of marital rights and obligations 
reveals some that can be altered—such as medical decision-making authority—and others 
that cannot be—like professional ethics rules or workers’ compensation eligibility. See id. 
 285. See Polikoff, supra note 213, at 370–72 (asserting that the dramatic variations in 
state laws establishing obligations between spouses means couples generally remain 
unaware of the specific legal obligations attendant to marriage); see also Lynn A. Baker & 
Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions and 
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 440–41, 
445 (1993) (finding that marriage-license applicants surveyed had “largely incorrect 
perceptions of the legal terms of the marriage contract as embodied in divorce statutes.”). 
Even if it were possible for people to know all of the legal rights accompanying marriage, 
the laws might change or the couple might move to a different state. 
 286. See MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE 103 (2010) (“In entering into a 
marriage, participants indicate their assent to a specific formal status that comes with a set 
of enforceable legal rights and responsibilities.”); Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21, at 93–
95 (noting that the institutionalized expectations of marriage are well understood and 
deliberately chosen by those who marry). Of course, there is always room for 
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spouses may fight intensely about the consequences of those 
obligations, they rarely question their legitimacy.287 That is because 
the act of entering marriage—most commonly accomplished through 
the execution of formalities like the performance of a marriage 
ceremony and signing of a marriage license—invokes a powerful set 
of social norms that substitute for the myriad legal details.288 
The social norms around the institution of marriage minimize 
concerns about whether the act of choosing to marry reflects the 
subjective desires of the spouses to perform the basic duties of 
marriage, aligning the value of will with the function of authorization. 
As Elizabeth Scott has observed, marriage is accompanied by 
commitment norms that define marriage as a “lasting, cooperative, 
[and] intimate relationship,” with obligations running to spouses and 
children.289 Much like in the contracts context, agreement to the “key 
terms” of marriage justifies the imposition of detailed rules governing 
property ownership, duties of support, and the various rules that will 
govern if the spouses divorce.290 
In contrast, nonmarriage lacks norms that align behavior and 
law.291 Therefore, it is nearly impossible to point to one act as 
justifying the imposition of the panoply of legal obligations that 
accompany marriage. With apologies to Leo Tolstoy, marriages are 
 
improvement. Professor Teri Dobbins Baxter has argued that states must do more to 
make marrying couples aware of the property rights that will govern their relationship and 
provide couples the opportunity to change those rights at the point they sign their 
marriage license. See Teri Dobbins Baxter, Marriage on Our Own Terms, 41 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 38 (2017). 
 287. The small number of cases in which spouses raise fraudulent inducement claims, 
as compared to the number of divorce cases within the same jurisdiction, supports this 
argument. A quick search in January 2018 of West’s Key Number Digest reveals sixty-nine 
California headnotes raising fraud as grounds for annulment (West Key Number 253, 
k321). In comparison, there were 4,998 California headnotes regarding community 
property obligations (West Key Number 253V, k751–k1070).  
 288. See Matsumura, supra note 10, at 2048, 2051; see also Carbone & Cahn, supra note 
21, at 93–95. 
 289. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1901, 1907–12 (2000); see also Scott & Scott, supra note 44, at 1251 (observing 
“the relative harmony between [spouses’] preferences and the societal norms and legal 
default rules that form the common understandings about marital behavior”); Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, “Getting the Government out of Marriage” Post Obergefell: The Ill-
Considered Consequences of Transforming the State’s Relationship to Marriage, 2016 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1445, 1476–77 (asserting that doing away with civil marriage would risk 
disrupting the positive norms that marriage has retained post-Obergefell). 
 290. This is not to say that marital behavior necessarily conforms to these norms. See 
Case, supra note 173, at 1765.  
 291. See supra Part I (describing the tremendous variation in how nonmarital 
relationships are structured). 
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(theoretically) all alike; every nonmarriage is nonmarital in its own 
way.292 
Moreover, although the choice to marry suffices as consent to the 
various rights and obligations of marriage, the bundling of those 
rights and obligations is not necessarily optimal. Scholars have 
pointed out that marriage is bursting at the seams.293 For example, 
Kerry Abrams has demonstrated that the use of marriage to award 
various public benefits has resulted in concerns that people will use 
marriage instrumentally, which has in turn promoted the proliferation 
of doctrines to detect marriage fraud.294 If, in light of social trends and 
legal developments like no-fault divorce, marriage is no longer 
permanent, then it will raise the possibility of fraud and not always be 
the best vehicle for awarding benefits based on support or 
dependency.295 Additionally, many of the laws that classify on the 
basis of marriage promote family structures based on gender norms 
that some may find offensive and that, at any rate, no longer describe 
the way that a majority of households operate.296 Thus, regardless of 
 
 292. See LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 3 (Leonard J. Kent & Nina Berberova eds., 
Constance Garnett trans., Modern Library 2000) (1877) (“Happy families are all alike; 
every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”). 
 293. See Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) (“Simply put, 
we are asking marriage to do too much.”); Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social 
Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 323–24 (2004) (challenging the perception of 
marriage as a “benevolent monolith” and proposing to disaggregate its functions); cf. 
James Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 32 (2003) 
(predicting that “family law is moving from a conception of marriage as an institution with 
a uniform meaning to a more variegated view that assesses marriage in terms of discrete 
groupings, or ‘bundles,’ of rights and responsibilities”). 
 294. Abrams, supra note 293, passim. 
 295. See id. at 54–57. 
 296. See id. at 58–60. Consent historically operated to justify the imposition of all the 
legal rules comprising the marital status. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY 
OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 11 (2002) (“The man and woman consented to marry, 
but public authorities set the terms of the marriage.	.	.	.	Once the union was formed, its 
obligations were fixed in common law.”). These legal rules systematically disadvantaged 
wives. See id. at 11–12. Rules like the marital rape exception, which made husbands legally 
exempt from raping their wives, see Jill Elaine Hasday, Consent and Contest: A Legal 
History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2000), were justified by the 
consensual nature of marriage. See id. at 1386–87. That is, the wife’s consent to sex was 
“conclusively inferred .	.	. from the couple’s initial agreement to marry.” Id. at 1387. Even 
setting aside the substantive unfairness of these rules, this example illustrates the dangers 
of inferring broad consent to every legal incident of marriage from the choice to marry. 
Where the rights of marriage exist at cross-purposes, there is a danger of offering marriage 
as a take-it-or-leave-it whole. Moreover, as scholars have observed in other contexts, there 
are likely cognitive limits on the amount of information to which one can consent in a 
single act. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for 
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003) (exploring the limited capacity of 
persons to process information); see, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The 
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whether one would prefer to unbundle marriage or to leave it 
untouched, there are good reasons to analyze the functions separately 
outside of marriage. 
Unmarried partners may make commitments piecemeal rather 
than wholesale. It seems unlikely based on the way most relationships 
unfold that people contemplate their commitments as a single, take-
it-or-leave-it whole. Commitments are often incremental—e.g., 
deciding first to split the rent rather than agreeing to divide all 
property during the relationship as if married297—and unfold over 
time. Further, the commitments may cover distinct types of 
performances regarding, for example, childcare, domestic duties, or 
finances that the partners understand to be separate, and that can be 
completed independently of each other. Scholars studying lower 
income cohabiting couples report that unmarried couples with 
children will often live together for the benefit of their child and at 
the same time eschew financial entanglements.298 These living 
situations demonstrate that childrearing and finances are not 
inherently linked: one can consent to one set of obligations without 
necessarily consenting to the other. 
There are costs and benefits to treating a complex transaction as 
a series of separate agreements or one entire agreement. In some 
cases, the various commitments are part of a package deal to which 
the parties arguably would not have agreed if separate.299 But 
recognizing separate agreements allows the parties to receive the 
benefit of bargains regarding completed performances even if some 
 
Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 687 (2011) (discussing 
information overload within the context of consumer disclosure requirements); Karen 
Bradshaw Schulz, Information Flooding, 48 IND. L. REV. 755, 762 (2015) (analyzing the 
effects of information overload on consumer decision making). Whatever lessons these 
arguments provide when considering consent to marital obligations, they only strengthen 
the proposal to disaggregate the rights and obligations when determining consent to 
nonmarital regulation.  
 297. The latter sharing arrangement was the alleged agreement in Marvin v. Marvin, 
557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
 298. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21, at 96–97; see also EDIN & KEFALAS, supra 
note 97, at 106–09 (describing a couple jointly raising a child while avoiding financial 
commitments). 
 299. See, e.g., Rudman v. Cowles Commc’ns, Inc., 280 N.E.2d 867, 873 (N.Y. 1972) 
(involving the attempt by the seller of a small business to a larger company to rescind the 
sale based on the breach of his employment agreement by that company). Leases were 
once treated as independent covenants, such that if the tenant failed to pay rent, the 
landlord could sue for the unpaid amounts yet would not be excused from providing 
possession. Those covenants are now treated as interdependent. See Henry E. Smith, 
Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1189 
(2006). 
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aspects of the transaction fall through. Particularly in complex 
relationships, a modular approach—in which a complex system is 
broken down into pieces that perform separate functions relatively 
independently300—provides several benefits. As Henry Smith has 
pointed out, “modularity allows a system to manage uncertainty; 
because each module can function and develop in relative isolation, 
these processes can occur without the need to resolve uncertainty 
elsewhere in the system.”301 The human mind is better able to grasp a 
complex phenomenon when the phenomenon is modular.302  
Modularity provides a useful metaphor for informal 
relationships. Informal relationships are complex because they serve 
varied functions, involve a range of conduct, and depend on the 
subjective and changing views of at least two individuals, each with 
their own interests. At any given moment, the partners may disagree 
about the significance or “meaning” of their relationship, and the law 
might likewise struggle to categorize it. Modules, like financial 
arrangements or childcare schedules, are easier to identify. They 
reduce information and negotiation costs by allowing partners to 
identify and discuss discrete functions without having to reassess the 
entire relationship.303 
Once we entertain the possibility of disaggregation, the challenge 
then becomes correctly determining whether the different 
commitments should rise and fall together or whether they can be 
teased apart. Again, contract doctrine provides some useful tools to 
answer that question. 
It is common for parties to enter multiple separate agreements 
rather than a single, compound transaction. A manufacturer like 
Foxconn may enter into an agreement with a seller like Apple to 
provide different models of iPhones and iPads over the course of 
many years, each product with its own prices and specifications.304 In a 
merger or acquisition, the buyer and target will execute an acquisition 
 
 300. Smith, supra note 299, at 1176 (“[M]odularity is a device to deal with complexity 
by decomposing a complex system into pieces (modules), in which communications (or 
other interdependencies) are intense within the module but sparse and standardized 
across modules.”). 
 301. Id. at 1177. 
 302. See id. at 1179. 
 303. The effect of modularization on reducing information costs and streamlining 
negotiation has been amply explored in the contract literature. See, e.g., Joshua Fairfield, 
The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 
1401, 1176–77 (2009); Smith, supra note 299, at 1177. 
 304. See, e.g., David Barboza, How China Built ‘iPhone City’ with Billions in Perks for 
Apple’s Partner, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29
/technology/apple-iphone-china-foxconn.html [https://perma.cc/S2VG-CMF6 (dark archive)]. 
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agreement—for instance an asset purchase agreement, stock purchase 
agreement, or merger agreement—but may also execute a variety of 
stand-alone agreements covering, for instance, confidentiality, the 
transfer of intellectual property, or the future employment of key 
individuals.305 A professor with an annual contract may accept 
additional compensation from her home institution to create and 
teach an online course.306 
Courts have come up with tests to determine whether 
commitments form part of the same agreement such that they rise or 
fall together. Whether the agreement is entire or separate turns 
“primarily on the intention of the parties, the subject matter of the 
agreement, and the conduct of the parties.”307 The touchstone of the 
inquiry is whether the parties intended a single assent to an entire 
transaction, or a separate assent to each of several things.308 In 
answering that question, courts have examined the overlap between 
the “nature and purpose” of the agreements; whether each agreement 
is supported by separate consideration; and whether the obligations 
triggered by the agreements will be discharged by the same or 
different occurrences.309 Applying this test, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a provision in which a 
seller agreed to transfer real property to a buyer for a specified price, 
and a provision in which the seller agreed to pay the broker a 
commission, were two separate agreements even though set forth in a 
single document.310 One agreement was for the sale of real property; 
the other was for an employment contract.311 The two provisions 
rested on different consideration: the exchange of money for property 
 
 305. See Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1411–16 (2016). 
 306. See, e.g., RUTGERS UNIV., DRAFT LETTER AGREEMENT FOR ONLINE COURSE 
WITH FULL-TIME FACULTY (2012), http://senate.rutgers.edu
/OnlineCourseAgreementLetterDraftRePearson.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQP2-ADNR]. 
 307. Stanley Works v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 S.W.3d 816, 827 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
 308. See id.; see also Rudman v. Cowles Commc’ns, Inc., 280 N.E.2d 867, 873 (N.Y. 
1972). In cases involving written agreements, the form of the agreements—whether 
memorialized in a single or different documents—can serve as evidence of intent, see 
Schron v. Grunstein, 917 N.Y.S.2d 820, 824 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011), although courts have 
concluded that a single written document actually contained multiple separate 
agreements, see, e.g., In re Gardinier, Inc., 831 F.2d 974, 976 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 309. In re Gardinier, 831 F.2d at 976; see also Wood v. Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke 
Cty., 818 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Piedmont Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 116 
S.E.2d 63, 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961)) (noting that under Georgia law, a contract is separate if 
“the quantity, service, or thing is to be accepted by separate performances”). 
 310. See In re Gardinier, 831 F.2d at 976. 
 311. Id. 
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in one case, and different money for services in the second.312 These 
types of inquiries could easily be adapted to the intimate context. 
Agreements about childcare responsibilities would be presumptively 
distinct from decisions Fabout the pooling of assets unless the facts 
suggested that the partners saw those decisions as related, for 
example, if one partner reduced his work responsibilities and shortly 
thereafter began to perform a greater share of childcare. 
Disaggregation questions the relatedness of different obligations, 
but it does not presuppose that the parties intended commitments to 
be separate. In Hewitt v. Hewitt,313 for example, a woman lived with a 
man for fifteen years in a marriage-like relationship, raising the 
couple’s three children and devoting her efforts to enhancing his 
professional standing in reliance on his promise to share his earnings 
and property with her.314 Under her version of events, her decision to 
support the couple’s children was part of an arrangement that 
included the pooling of income and property.315 She would not have 
entered the relationship at the outset without all of these functions 
being linked. A court could consider that evidence in determining the 
scope of legal obligations to which the parties consented through their 
conduct. 
In sum, when seeking to impose legal obligations on people in 
nonmarital relationships, the law can and should see those obligations 
as something less than a marriage-like whole. With those obligations 
more precisely identified, courts can inquire whether the parties 
objectively manifested their desire to perform the key aspects of 
those obligations. 
IV.  APPLYING THE CONSENT FRAMEWORK 
Consent—in particular, the two-pronged approach set forth in 
the previous Part—offers a superior justificatory rationale for 
regulating intimate relationships. This Part demonstrates how consent 
theory can both improve the assignment of inter se obligations and 
ground the extension of state-provided rights and obligations based 
on characteristics of the relationship. 
 
 312. Id. 
 313. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979). 
 314. Id. at 1205. 
 315. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately held that the woman failed to state a 
claim for relief because of a public policy against the recognition of contracts between 
cohabitants. Id. at 1211. This rule, which is at odds with the approach of a majority of 
states, was recently affirmed in Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 849–60 (Ill. 2016). 
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A. Reforming Current Approaches 
The most immediate payoff of orienting regulation around 
consent is in reforming existing approaches to the resolution of inter 
se disputes between partners or their estates at the end of the 
relationship. These claims arise when partners have joined their lives 
in certain respects and seek the law’s assistance to help disentangle 
their respective rights. Because this context often requires the law to 
impose legal obligations over the parties’ disagreement, consent is 
critical. 
Returning to a hypothetical from the Introduction of the Article, 
recall Anna and Ben, who have lived together for approximately a 
decade and who have six-figure salaries each (although Anna’s is 
higher). Assume that the couple also jointly purchased a home, 
contributing slightly different amounts to the down payment but 
paying the mortgage equally. Regarding that home purchase, Anna 
spent more time reviewing legal documents while Ben spent more 
time updating and maintaining the property. Now imagine that Anna 
and Ben break up. 
Under an implied contract approach, the scope of relief would 
depend on the promises alleged by the parties.316 Ben, as the lower 
earning partner, might bring a variety of claims. He could seek 
equitable division of the couple’s income during the course of the 
relationship under the theory that the couple agreed that they would 
own everything fifty-fifty. He could instead assert a claim for an equal 
division of the couple’s shared real property. Or he could claim he is 
owed remuneration for his nonfinancial contributions. 
The first, and broadest, claim is similar to the one brought in 
Marvin and has been repeatedly rejected by the courts.317 Ben could 
argue that the fact that he covered the couple’s living expenses when 
Anna was in law school evinces the couple’s intent to create marital-
like property rights, but their tendency to keep their finances separate 
would weigh against that evidence. The second claim for equal 
division of the property might be belied by their unequal 
contributions. And although courts increasingly rely on the doctrine 
of unjust enrichment to reimburse partners’ financial contributions,318 
 
 316. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 118 n.16 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (noting that the 
difference between an express and implied contract is the absence of “direct words of the 
parties” and a focus instead on “acts and conduct” under the circumstances). 
 317. See Antognini, supra note 20, at 30. 
 318. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21, at 64–68 (providing an overview of cases 
examining the theory of unjust enrichment in the context of unmarried couples); Candace 
Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Cohabitation and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust 
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courts struggle to value nonfinancial contributions and usually reject 
or discount them.319 Regarding the third claim, the unjust enrichment 
remedy would quantify and reimburse their respective financial 
contributions but might not reach much further. 
The model of consent advanced in this Article suggests 
refinements to the implied contract approach. First, except in 
exceptional circumstances, parties should avoid bringing broad claims 
about intending to create quasi-marriages. The consent lens explains 
why claims analogizing to marriage are less likely to prevail than the 
ones alleging concrete exchanges supported by the facts.320 
Disaggregated claims would make courts more comfortable about 
granting relief and would help to develop a body of case law 
regarding the types of conduct typically giving rise to more limited 
obligations. Second, and relatedly, courts should be more receptive to 
arguments alleging these discrete legal consequences. In the absence 
of express promises, the critical inquiry should be whether the facts 
suggest that the parties consented to that legal consequence; this 
represents a shift of focus from a futile inquiry into subjective intent 
to whether the state action is justified. For example, although it would 
be difficult to prove agreement by Anna and Ben to own their real 
property fifty-fifty given their unequal financial contributions, a court 
should be able to consider whether the circumstances indicate consent 
by Anna to an equal division of the property based on Ben’s 
nonfinancial contributions. Statements through the years about the 
equality of their contributions, or suggesting the partners understood 
that Ben was making an in-kind contribution, could suffice as proof. 
Focusing on consent also suggests reforms for jurisdictions 
pursuing status approaches. Under the current status approaches, a 
court will analogize the relationship to marriage, either by looking at 
factors that suggest a marriage-like relationship321 or by presuming 
 
Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1419 (2011) (asserting that “many cases 
decided in the later part of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first 
century have allowed one cohabitant from a terminated relationship to recover from the 
other” under an unjust enrichment theory). 
 319. See Antognini, supra note 20, at 43–46 (concluding that courts often consider 
nonfinancial contributions in nonmarital relationships as “less valuable than financial 
contributions”). 
 320. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21, at 67 (explaining that “states continue to vary 
in their willingness to address claims arising from nonmarital cohabitation,” but suggesting 
that courts are showing a greater willingness to untangle ownership of assets of 
nonmarried couples). 
 321. Under the Washington meretricious relationship line of cases, the court assesses 
whether the relationship was “marital-like” based on “continuous cohabitation, duration 
of the relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and services for joint 
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that their lengthy cohabitation means they are domestic partners.322 
Depending on whether their relationship is sufficiently marriage-like, 
either all the income and property acquired during their relationship, 
as well as their liabilities, will be subject to equitable distribution, or 
none of it will. A presumption based on cohabitation would likely 
favor equitable distribution in this context: the law would divide 
Anna’s surplus earnings with Ben and might even subject her to 
obligations of support.323 
The lens of consent reveals the shortcomings of the status 
approach. The parties’ acts make it unlikely that Anna intended to 
divide her earnings over the course of the relationship, and especially 
unlikely that she foresaw the relationship giving rise to an ongoing 
duty of support. A status modeled on marriage, though, provides two 
options: recognize these rights in full or not at all. Neither outcome 
aligns with the ways that Anna and Ben lived their lives. The legal 
consequences stray too far from the parties’ subjective preferences, 
threatening their autonomy. Applying the principles of consent 
articulated in the previous Part, states interested in pursuing a status 
approach must recognize the existence of disaggregated rights and 
obligations. This weighs in favor of providing a plurality of statuses or 
a range of legal consequences stemming from a determination that an 
informal partnership exists to address the diversity of nonmarital 
relationships.324  
The correctness of this solution becomes more obvious when 
thinking about another hypothetical couple from the Introduction, 
 
projects, and the intent of the parties.” Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 
1995) (en banc) (citing In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984) (en 
banc)); see, e.g., Latham v. Hennessey, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wash. 1976) (en banc); In re 
Marriage of DeHollander, 770 P.2d 638, 641 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). If the relationship is 
“marital-like,” the court will identify the property acquired during the relationship and 
make an equitable division. Connell, 898 P.2d at 835–36.  
 322. Under the ALI approach, Anna and Ben’s lengthy cohabitation would trigger a 
presumption that the couple shared a life together. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §	6.03(3) (AM. LAW INST. 
2002). If the party contesting the relationship failed to rebut the presumption, the same 
rules governing division of marital property would apply, see §	6.05, and Ben, as the lower 
earning partner, would potentially be entitled to compensatory payments (spousal 
support), see §	6.06. 
 323. See §	5.04 (providing for compensatory payments for the loss of “marital” living 
standard depending on the income discrepancy and duration of the relationship). 
 324. Clare Chambers has come to a similar conclusion, although she has not focused 
much attention on how the state would identify to couples for whom the statuses would 
apply—under my analysis, consent would provide the answer. See Clare Chambers, The 
Limitations of Contract, in AFTER MARRIAGE: RETHINKING MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS 
51, 74–77 (Elizabeth Brake ed., 2016). 
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Camille and David. Because they live under the same roof and share 
a child, Camille and David would almost certainly be treated under 
the ALI Principles as domestic partners, meaning they would be 
subject to marital property rules upon the breakdown of their 
relationship.325 Yet Camille, like the working-class individuals on 
whom her character is based,326 likely took steps to avoid financial 
entanglements because she did not want to entwine her fate with 
David’s. She may have kept the lease in her name and her earnings in 
a separate checking account. Moreover, although David contributed 
some money to buy things for their child and may even have 
purchased things for the household from time to time, Camille did not 
come to personally depend on his financial contributions. To subject 
them to a monolithic status that would redistribute the couple’s 
property would likely contravene their wishes and expose parties like 
Camille to disabling legal consequences. That said, their conduct 
could justify the creation of co-parenting obligations.327 Consent 
explains why the law could recognize the relationship for some 
purposes but not others.328 
B. Recognizing Rights and Obligations from the State 
Although the bulk of judicial attention has focused on the 
resolution of inter se disputes, marriage comes with rights and 
obligations designed to nourish the relationship, support the family, 
and advance other objectives like privatizing dependency.329 Unlike in 
the inter se context, nonmarital partners may actually agree about the 
nature of their relationship—i.e., that it involves commitment, 
intimacy, or mutual support. But with rare exceptions, states currently 
award these rights based on formal status, granting rights to those 
 
 325. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS §	6.03(2) (declaring persons domestic partners when they have 
maintained a common household with their common child for a continuous period of time 
set by state rule). 
 326. See supra text accompanying note 97; see supra Section I.A.3. 
 327. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for 
Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 225–31 (2015) (proposing broader co-
parenting rights for nonmarital parents). 
 328. June Carbone and Naomi Cahn have criticized the tendency of the law to treat 
nonmarital couples inconsistently with regard to parental and property rights. See Carbone 
& Cahn, supra note 21, at 58–59 (advocating for a “unified approach” to both parental and 
property rights in the nonmarriage context). This Article’s focus on consent could explain 
and justify those inconsistent outcomes. 
 329. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Family Support and Supporting Families, 68 VAND. 
L. REV. EN BANC 153, 176–77 (2015); Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private 
Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1835, 1837 (2014). 
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who have married or have registered for alternate statuses, like 
domestic partnerships, and withholding rights from those who have 
not.330 Courts have upheld the state’s prerogative to associate certain 
rights and benefits with marriage without having to offer those rights 
to people in informal relationships.331 
There are justifications for this differential treatment beyond the 
promotion of marriage or disapproval of nonmarital relationships.332 
A state might worry about partners fraudulently claiming benefits and 
then denying obligations when it suits them.333 Adjudicating eligibility 
would also impose burdens on the courts or government agencies.334 
These concerns are serious and deserve deep treatment beyond the 
scope this Article provides. But both point to a more fundamental 
problem to which consent is relevant: What are the criteria for 
awarding the rights and obligations, and how can we tell if they have 
been satisfied? Put another way, how do we identify those partners to 
whom rights should flow? 
Scholars advocating for the extension of rights such as workers’ 
compensation, Social Security, inheritance, and favorable tax 
treatment to partners in informal relationships have not satisfactorily 
 
 330. See, e.g., Holguin v. Flores, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 749, 756, 758–60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 
(upholding the denial of standing to sue for wrongful death because the plaintiff was not 
married and reasoning that the state had adequate reasons to distinguish between married 
and unmarried people). 
 331. See id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 
2083–84 (2005) (arguing that the right to marriage is merely a right of access to whatever 
panoply of benefits a state decides to associate with the status). But see Joslin, supra note 
21, at 481–87 (arguing that the denial of certain rights, like some ability to create shared 
interests in property, could violate a right to nonmarriage). 
 332. For examples of these traditional justifications, see Charron v. Amaral, 889 
N.E.2d 946, 949 (Mass. 2008) (quoting Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095, 
1096 (Mass. 1987)); Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988); Blumberg, supra note 
29, at 1144–46 (claiming that the marital requirement in the Social Security context was 
motivated by moral considerations). Numerous scholars have questioned whether 
developments in the law have undercut these morality-based arguments. 
 333. See Abrams, supra note 293, at 6 (“In short, because marriage became easier to 
get in and out of, and because there were more benefits attached to it, people had greater 
incentives to use it instrumentally.”); see also PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal 
Bd. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269, 1281 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). 
 334. See Elden, 758 P.2d at 587 (refusing to extend standing to sue for loss of 
consortium to cohabitants in part because “[i]t would require a court to inquire into the 
relationship of the partners”). Some scholars who advocate for the expansion of rights to 
people in informal relationships do not expect the burden to be too overwhelming. See, 
e.g., Bowman, supra note 105, at 32, 32 n.118. The existence of a burden on the courts does 
not make the burden unwarranted or illegitimate; it burdens the courts to perform 
factfinding in run-of-the-mill breach of contract actions, but such actions are still 
permitted. 
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answered these questions.335 To the extent that they propose entry 
requirements for these various rights at all, these scholars tend to 
settle on cohabitation for a predetermined time period.336 The 
problem is that cohabitation is a muddy indicator of the partners’ 
subjective views about the relationship, as discussed above.337 The 
usefulness of cohabitation further decreases if duration matters: 
people may gradually consolidate two separate living situations, 
making it unclear when they begin sharing the same household.338 The 
reliance on cohabitation stems from the rejection of consent. But that 
rejection has led away from productive answers to the questions 
posed in the previous paragraph. To wit: in the most detailed extant 
analysis of the relationship between objective conduct and state-
provided benefits like Social Security, Grace Blumberg has argued 
that the purpose of those benefits is to “ensure that certain persons 
likely to have been dependent on the worker are supported by an 
earmarked fund.”339 But rather than looking to signs of dependency 
or economic integration, Blumberg has proposed that the government 
look to cohabitation340 which, as discussed in Part I.A, could be 
accompanied by very little financial dependency. 
By requiring the state to articulate a relationship between 
conduct and different state-provided benefits that the state seeks to 
target, consent provides an improved framework for solving the 
 
 335. See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 21, at 146–207 (arguing to extend to nontraditional 
couples rights relating to health insurance, medical decision making, hospital visitation, 
protected medical leave, Social Security, workers’ compensation—and, upon death or 
dissolution—financial and custody rights); Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1137–59. Allowing 
people to formally opt into statuses that provide these rights would be a straightforward 
solution. See, e.g., Jessica R. Feinberg, The Survival of Nonmarital Relationship Statuses in 
the Same-Sex Marriage Era: A Proposal, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 45, 64–70 (2014) (proposing the 
creation of official nonmarital statuses at the state level for which couples could sign up). 
The problem is that the solution would not reach many, if not most, people in informal 
relationships. See Bowman, supra note 105, at 32.  
 336. See supra note 42. 
 337. See supra Section I.A. As a case in point, Professor Bowman has recently 
proposed extending certain rights to people in LAT relationships because of the essential 
qualities of many of those relationships. See Bowman, supra note 105, at 33. But her 
proposal has not spelled out how the state actors who administer those rights would 
identify which LAT couples qualify. See id. 
 338. See, e.g., Waggoner, supra note 21, at 240 (proposing that courts should consider 
the duration of a cohabiting relationship but failing to set forth a specific timeframe for 
when a couple becomes de-facto-married).  
 339. Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1147. 
 340. Id. at 1148 (“I recommend, therefore, that an unmarried co-habitant who can 
demonstrate that she shares or shared a common household with an insured worker be 
entitled to Social Security derivative benefits as though she were a current, former, or 
surviving spouse of the insured worker.”).  
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identification problem. The remainder of this Section sketches a 
vision of how consent can ground the extension of rights to people in 
informal relationships, focusing in particular on the challenges of 
identification and norm development. Determining whether a person 
has consented to a legal obligation involves determining the scope of 
the obligation and the relevant justificatory act. 
Laws that classify based on relationship status should be based 
upon rational distinctions between single individuals and people in 
relationships.341 In other words, there should be some articulable 
reason or justification for the classification, whether it involves 
providing Social Security survivor benefits or the joint filing of an 
income tax return. To be sure, lawmakers seldom articulate official 
justifications for their classifications, and, even when they do, those 
justifications may be so broad that they are of limited use.342 But the 
law does not speak clearly about the reasons it classifies based on 
marriage because it has rarely been called on to do so. Moreover, 
when necessary, scholars and courts have demonstrated that it is 
possible to analyze statutory schemes and identify the motivating 
considerations.343 For example, the federal government will consider 
informal relationships when determining eligibility for Supplemental 
Security Income (“SSI”) benefits.344 The Social Security 
Administration will treat a couple as married if they “live together in 
the same household” and “lead people to believe that [they] are 
husband and wife.”345 Courts have found that the SSI regulation is 
rooted in the assumption that two people living together in a marital-
like relationship will provide financial support to the other: that they 
will pool their finances.346 Workers’ compensation insurance makes 
 
 341. See Krause, supra note 43, at 276, 278 (arguing that under a “pragmatic, rational 
approach,” the law should “ask what social functions of a particular association justify 
extending what social benefits and privileges,” such that “[m]arried and unmarried couples 
who are in the same factual positions [would] be treated alike.”). 
 342. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §	2601(b)(1) (2012) (stating that one purpose of the Family & 
Medical Leave Act is “to promote the stability and economic security of families”). 
 343. See generally Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1126 (examining laws governing 
“benefits and rights that normally accrue as incidents of marriage”); Stephen D. 
Sugarman, What Is a “Family”? Conflicting Messages from our Public Programs, 42 FAM. 
L.Q. 231 (2008) (analyzing various government programs like food stamps and public 
housing and identifying the purposes of treating individuals as part of a recognized family 
unit). 
 344. See Aloni, supra note 6, at 1291–94 (explaining that “parties do not have to be 
legally married to be considered spouses for the purposes of SSI eligibility—they only 
need to hold themselves out as a married couple”). 
 345. See 20 C.F.R. §	416.1806(a)(3) (2017). 
 346. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld lower benefits for cohabitant 
applicants because “two people living together can live more economically than they 
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employers responsible for workers’ actual dependents—those who 
receive significant financial support from the insured or are 
financially interdependent.347 These characteristics (e.g., pooling 
finances or providing financial support) should set the parameters of 
the legal treatment at issue; they should define the legal obligation. 
Although people in nonmarital relationships often fail (or choose 
not) to formalize their relationships, they frequently perform acts that 
the state could deem relevant to the legal obligations just described. 
Sometimes, they identify themselves by affirmatively seeking a 
benefit. Arizona, for example, once allowed state employees to claim 
health insurance benefits for a nonmarital partner with whom the 
employee had cohabited for at least a year and created financial 
interdependency.348 To obtain coverage, the employee had to submit a 
“Qualified Domestic Partner Affidavit” including three of the 
following forms of proof: 
i. Having a joint mortgage, joint property tax identification, or 
joint tenancy on a residential lease;  
ii. Holding one or more credit or bank accounts jointly, such as 
a checking account, in both names;  
iii. Assuming joint liabilities;  
iv. Having joint ownership of significant property, such as real 
estate, a vehicle, or a boat;  
v. Naming the partner as beneficiary on the employee’s life 
insurance, under the employee’s will, or employee’s retirement 
annuities and being named by the partner as beneficiary of the 
partner’s life insurance, under the partner’s will, or the 
partner’s retirement annuities; and  
vi. Each agreeing in writing to assume financial responsibility 
for the welfare of the other, such as durable power of attorney; 
or  
vii. Other proof of financial interdependence as approved by 
the Director.349 
 
would if each lived alone.” Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 92-231, at 150, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5136). Embedded in this 
statement is the assumption that the partners benefit from economies of scale—that they 
integrate their finances. Another justification appears to be fraud prevention. See 
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777 (1975) (noting “[t]he danger of persons entering a 
marriage relationship not to enjoy its traditional benefits, but instead to enable one spouse 
to claim benefits upon the anticipated early death of the wage earner”). 
 347. See Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1140–44. 
 348. See Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 799–800 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, Diaz v. 
Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth criteria that must be satisfied in order 
to obtain health coverage). 
 349. Id. at 800. 
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The Arizona experience demonstrates that nonmarital partners 
will identify themselves to claim a discrete benefit and may do so in a 
way that reveals characteristics that the law values—in this case, 
financial interdependency. Were it available, partners would likely 
claim loss of consortium for injuries suffered by the other350 or apply 
for benefits like Fair Housing Act loans.351 In doing so, they would 
make representations about functions their relationship performs: 
that it involves support, financial partnership, stability, etc. 
On the flip side, partners make representations about the 
absence of a relationship to claim a benefit or avoid an obligation. 
These instances, too, provide information about characteristics of the 
relationship. For example, the federal government will consider 
informal relationships when determining eligibility for SSI benefits or 
student loans.352 When applying for these benefits, partners may 
proceed as if single, omitting any mention of their relationships. They 
may also object to determinations that their relationships should 
affect their entitlement to benefits, in the process revealing and 
denying critical features.353 
If the couple represents that their relationship qualifies for a 
right based on a certain characteristic, they often will have consented 
to the imposition of obligations based on that characteristic. 
Returning to an opening hypothetical, if Camille and David were to 
open a joint checking account and name each other as beneficiaries in 
their wills and then apply for insurance coverage for David from 
Camille’s employer,354 those acts would be strong evidence of pooling 
finances that the Social Security Administration could take into 
account if one of them applied for SSI benefits. Conversely, if the 
state is willing to impose a disability based on that function—i.e., 
mutual financial support—the parties should have a strong claim to 
rights that are awarded based on that same function. Equality 
 
 350. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Mini Coach of Bos., Inc., 799 N.E.2d 1256, 1256–57 
(Mass. 2003) (involving the attempt by a cohabitant in a ten-year relationship to recover 
for injuries sustained by her partner). 
 351. See Let FHA Loans Help You, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/buying/loans [https://perma.cc/UK9Q-FMWX] (explaining FHA 
loans are insured by Federal Housing Administration, enabling lenders to “offer 
[prospective homeowners] a better deal”). 
 352. See Aloni, supra note 6, at 1294–95. 
 353. See, e.g., Dutko v. Colvin, No. 15 CV-10698, 2015 WL 6750792, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 
Nov. 5, 2015) (revealing that the couple had cohabited for over twenty years and that the 
applicant received health insurance coverage through her “boyfriend’s” employer and 
purchased a house together). 
 354. Assuming, of course, that such coverage were available. 
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presupposes that cases that are similar in one normatively relative 
respect should be treated the same regarding that respect.355 
Admittedly, these functions are too broad to be of immediate 
use. For instance, the denial of a student loan to a person in an 
informal relationship based on mutual financial dependency and 
support does not point to which of the rights based on mutual 
financial dependency and support the couple may be entitled (like the 
Family Medical Leave Act, Social Security survivors benefits, or state 
income tax credits). But as courts, lawmakers, and agencies consider 
these claims, they would have the opportunity to define with more 
particularity how rights and obligations relate and to generate norms 
about what types of acts lead to the imposition of what types of legal 
obligations. 
This Section shows that the same consent framework that should 
guide the determination of inter se obligations between nonmarital 
partners provides a new way of thinking about a heretofore vexing 
question: when to extend state-provided rights and obligations to 
people in informal relationships. An added benefit of this approach is 
that it not only enables a more focused inquiry about legal obligations 
but minimizes the consequences of error. The trouble with all-or-
nothing status approaches is that the determination that a couple is in 
a marriage-like relationship imposes the full panoply of spousal 
property and support obligations.356 When one partner disputes the 
creation of legal obligations, the consequence of an adverse 
determination is significant. If the question is more particularized—
e.g., whether the couple agreed to share equally in a specific piece of 
property or intertwine their finances closely enough that the law 
should recognize the standing of one to sue for injuries to the other—
the consequences do not extend as far. A consent framework 
promises to create norms around informal relationships while 
simultaneously minimizing the potential for significant infringements 
on individual rights. 
 
 355. Stefan Gosepath, Equality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. §	2.1 (June 27, 2007), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality/ [https://perma.cc/8EKX-VWU7 (dark archive)]; 
see also Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 820 (arguing against the 
departure from the principle of symmetry in the law of family obligation without good 
cause). 
 356. As discussed in Section I.B., the Washington and ALI approaches impose the inter 
se obligations of marriage. Some proposals go further, treating qualifying couples as 
married for all purposes. See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 222; Waggoner, supra note 
21, at 241. 
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CONCLUSION 
Informal relationships pose a complicated regulatory puzzle: to 
do nothing will leave people without legal protections that, at least in 
the context of marriage, are thought to strengthen relationships and 
protect vulnerable partners; to do too much will impose obligations 
against the will of one or both partners. If it is going to regulate these 
relationships at all, the law must decide what rights and obligations to 
impose, and when in the relationship these rights should begin. 
Proxies like cohabitation or the duration of the relationship are vastly 
over- and under-inclusive. The insistence that obligations flow only 
from the will of the parties has also led to implementation problems. 
This Article has demonstrated that the answers to the puzzle must 
consider consent, not ignore it. 
Reclaiming the concept of consent and defining it is the first step 
to solving the puzzle. But it only raises other important questions. A 
key benefit of formality is administrability—formalities provide a 
convenient means to identify those to whom rights should flow.357 
Any attempt to regulate informal relationships will have to contend 
with the burdens of providing such recognition. Although there was 
some fear that recognizing Marvin-type claims would overwhelm the 
courts,358 those fears have not come to pass. Yet if the regulatory 
system were more effective at recognizing rights, it stands to reason 
that more people would attempt to establish them. Further, courts 
and lawmakers would have to generate standards by which to assess 
the parties’ conduct, raising questions about resources as well as 
comparative institutional competency. And this all presupposes that 
the law should regulate informal relationships. The descriptive work 
in Part I reveals that there may be reasons to recognize certain types 
of relationships—for instance, relationships involving significant 
income disparity and resultant dependency on the part of one 
partner—but not others, like those involving lower-income 
individuals for whom recognition could result in deprivation of 
property rights and valuable benefits. Accompanying the question of 
when to regulate is the question of whether the state should do so.359 
These interconnected questions deserve further attention. 
 
 357. See Clarke, supra note 16, at 771–72 (noting that formalities streamline decision 
making). 
 358. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 123–24 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (Clark, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (speculating that allowing express and implied contract claims 
between cohabitants would “surely generate undue burdens on our trial courts”). 
 359. See Krause, supra note 43, at 297 (calling this the “ultimate question on the road 
to partnership legislation” but declining to answer it). 
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Lest these daunting questions stall the endeavor in its tracks, I 
close by focusing on the benefits of a consent approach to informal 
relationship recognition. Approaching regulation through the lens of 
consent provides the impetus to identify the various packages of 
rights and duties and to identify the conduct relevant to those rights 
and duties. It also reveals the ways in which those rights are only 
incompletely provided to unmarried partners, highlighting the nature 
and injustice of their exclusion. And it provides insights into the 
dominant regulatory form of intimate relationships, marriage. If one 
size does not fit all nonmarital relationships, those insights provide 
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